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I. INTRODUCTION
Home ownership in America forms an elemental part of the
metaphorical American dream, conferring social status, financial security
and stronger community ties to its beneficiaries. 1 These benefits have been
extended to a growing portion of Americans in recent years, including
minority and lower-income persons who have traditionally been excluded
from access to the credit opportunities necessary to either purchase homes or
collateralize their home equity into valuable liquid assets. 2 Indeed, over the
past decade, an entirely new dynamic has emerged in the residential market:
a wave of new mortgage products - including loans to "subprime" borrowers
- and a host of newly prominent providers - including mortgage brokers,
mortgage bankers and finance companies - have simultaneously developed
3
to service this growing market sector.
Some of those new providers, however, have engaged in unscrupulous
business practices. Known as "predatory lenders," they prey on vulnerable
and financially unsophisticated persons, trapping thousands into exploitative4
loans that are as profitable for lenders as they are destructive for borrowers.
For years, predatory lending has sucked many billions of dollars out of the
home equity and from the income of many vulnerable Americans 5 and has
resulted in a rash of devastating residential home foreclosures throughout the
nation. 6 In part because current federal mortgage regulations and state law
fraud protections have not proved a sufficient deterrent, predatory lending
1.

See

KENNETH JACKSON, CRABGRASS

FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIzATION

OF THE

UNrrED STATES (1985).

2. According to a recent study by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD), 40% of new homeowners since 1994 are minorities, even though they
account for just 20% of the U.S. population. Similarly, African-American and Hispanic
homeownership rates have been growing at twice that of white homeowners. OFFICE OF
POLICY DEv. AND RESEARCH, DEP'T OF Hous. AND URBAN DEv., ISSUE BRIEF: FHA's IMPACT
ON INCREASING HOMEOWNERSHIP OPPORTUNITIES FOR LOW-INcoME AND MINORITY FAMILIES

DURING THE 1990S, at 3-4 (2000), available at http://www.huduser.orgIPublicationsPDFI
fha.pdf (Dec. 2000); see also JOINT CTR. FOR Hous. STUDIES OF HARvARD UNIV., THE STATE

HOUSING 15 (2003), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/
markets/son2003.pdf (last visited May 7, 2004).
3. See infra text accompanying notes 22-36.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 16-19.
OF THE NATION'S

5.

ERIC STEIN, COALITION FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, QUANTIFYING THE ECONOMIC

COST OF PREDATORY LENDING 2 (2001) (estimating that several categories of abusive lending
practices cost American homeowners $9.1 billion annually), available at http://www.
predatorylending.org/pdfs/QuantI0-01 .pdf (July 25, 2001).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 87-94.
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has been found in high concentrations in New Jersey. 7 Indeed, even defining
a core concept of "predatory lending" has eluded regulators 8 and scholars 9
because, as with the doctrine of unconscionability, its manifestations are
generally context-specific. 10
New Jersey, by passing the Home Ownership Security Act in 2002
(HOSA or the Act),1 1 became one of a handful of states to respond
comprehensively to the problem of predatory lending within its borders. 12
The New Jersey legislature did not choose to specifically define "predatory
lending" nor to simply craft a definition of the prohibited practice
sufficiently broad so that common law courts could adjudicate its parameters
on a case-by-case basis. Rather, following the lead of other states and a
7.
8.

See infra text accompanying notes 24, 41-44.

See SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, Hous. AND URBAN AFFAIRS, PREDATORY LENDING
PRACTICES: STAFF ANALYSIS OF REGULATORS' RESPONSES (2000) (recommending that no

additional regulations of "predatory lending" should be undertaken because no adequate
definition exists to describe the practice); see also HUD-TREASURY TASK FORCE ON
PREDATORY LENDING, CURBING PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING 27 (2000) [hereinafter
JOINT HUD-TEASuRy REPORT] (declining to establish a specific definition of "predatory
lending" but identifying core predatory lending practices that should be subject to regulation),
availableat http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/treasrpt.pdf (last visited May 7, 2004).
9. See Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization, and
the Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REv. 503, 511-13 (2002) (surveying

variety of definitions proposed by scholars and regulators). Professors Cathy C. Engel and

Patricia A. McCoy also demur from offering a precise definition of predatory lending,
choosing instead to classify certain lending practices as unfair through a framework of law and
economics. Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and
Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEx. L. REv. 1255, 1258 (2002). They suggest that
predatory behavior includes loans that: (i) are structured to result in seriously disproportionate
net harm to borrowers; (ii) engage in rent seeking; (iii) involve fraud or deceptive practices;
(iv) lack transparency; and (v) require borrowers to waive meaningful legal redress. id. at
1260.
10. Relying in part on a definition adopted by the New Jersey appellate division, the
authors would define "predatory lending" as a set of practices, engaged in by investors,
lenders, mortgage brokers and home improvement contractors, usually through aggressive or
deceptive sales tactics, that are so disadvantageous or abusive that the borrower is subjected to
an unreasonable risk of default and foreclosure. Assocs. Home Equity Serv., Inc. v. Troup,
778 A.2d 529, 536-37 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
11. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-22 (West 2003).
12. See 2003 ARK. Acts 2598 (2003); CAL. FIN. CODE § 4970-4979.7 (West 2003); Fair
Lending Act, GA. CODE. ANN. § 7-6A-1-13 (2003); High Risk Home Loan Act, 2003 Ill. Laws
93-561; High Cost Mortgage Loan Provisions, MAss REGS. CODE tit. 209, § 32.32 (2003);
2003 N.M. Laws 436; 2001 N.Y. Laws 11856; Restrictions and Limitations on High Cost
Home Loans, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1. le (2003); High Cost and Consumer Home Loans Act,
2003 S.C. Acts 42.
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framework set up by the Federal Home Ownership Equity Protection Act
(HOEPA), 13 New Jersey has designated certain practices abusive where they
have little or no market justification when made in connection with already
expensive residential mortgage loans and where they cause an unreasonable
risk of foreclosure. 14 The Act fills an important regulatory gap left open by
current federal and state law. By attempting to proscribe certain unjustifiable
practices in connection with high cost, higher-risk loans, the Act goes a long
way toward accomplishing its goals of simultaneously protecting home
ownership and keeping an ample supply of credit available at reasonable
15
terms to all borrowers, including subprime borrowers.
Part II of this Article describes the background of the emerging
predatory lending problem by locating the practice in the broader subprime
mortgage lending market, by identifying the emergence of loan terms and
practices that the New Jersey legislature concluded were abusive, and by
documenting the prevalence and consequences of the predatory lending
problem in New Jersey, particularly within low-income and minority
communities. Part 1II provides a detailed analysis of the Act's provisions,
demonstrating specifically how it is designed to remedy the problem and
highlighting some of its relative strengths and weaknesses. Part IV considers
some questions left open by the Act, including whether the Act could be
even more aggressive, whether it will hurt the broader subprime lending
market and the low-income and minority borrowers who often depend on it,
and whether its controversial provisions assigning liability for violations to
secondary market purchasers of mortgage notes will have a significant
impact on the availability of loans for New Jersey residents.
II. THE EMERGENCE OF PREDATORY LENDING IN NEW JERSEY

A. The Explosion of the Subprime Lending Market
Predatory lending is a distinct and dangerous subset of the generally
positive emergence of subprime lending in the residential mortgage market.
A subprime loan is typically intended to extend credit to a borrower who, for
reasons such as a poor credit record, high debt-to-income ratio, or unstable
employment history, cannot qualify for a conventional or prime mortgage

13. 15 U.S.C. § 1639 (2000).
14. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-25-26 (West 2003) (prohibiting certain practices in
connection with "high cost home loans").
15. § 46:10B-23(2)(b), (c).
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loan. 16 Because of the higher costs ostensibly associated with subprime
borrowers' greater risk of default, delinquency and foreclosure, subprime
loans carry higher interest rates than conventional loans. 17 Studies have
estimated that subprime loans have on average a two and a half to four
percentage points higher interest rate than prime loans. 18 Subprime lenders
also typically charge higher points and fees - charges assessed at the outset
of the loan and paid either in cash or financed into the overall loan
proceeds- to compensate for higher origination and servicing costs that
subprime loans are generally believed to carry. 19 Notwithstanding these
increased costs, subprime lending is generally considered to be a welcome
development, allowing those traditionally excluded from conventional
mortgage borrowing to access credit for home purchases 20 or to access the
21
equity in their homes for other uses.
The subprime lending industry, once virtually nonexistent, has
experienced tremendous growth in the past decade. In 1994, only $35 billion
of nationwide loans were subprime, accounting for less than 5% of overall
mortgage loan originations. By 1999, subprime lending totaled $160 billion
and its share of overall mortgage originations ballooned to 13%.22 Subprime
16. See JomN C. WaiCHER, THE HOME EQuIrY. LENDING INDUSTRY: REFINANCING
MORTGAGES FOR BoRRowERs wrrH IMPAIRED CREDIT 29 (1997).
17. JOINT HUD-TREASURY REPORT, supra note 8, at 27-28.
18. Id. at 30; see also Cathy L. Mansfield, The Road to Subprime "HEL" Was Paved
with Good Congressional Intentions: Usury Deregulation and the Subprime Home Equity
Market, 51 S.C. L. REv. 473, 537 (2000) (describing her study of a cross-section of subprime
loans originated between 1996 to 1999 with average interest rates 2.20 to 4.06 percentage
points higher than prime loans in a comparable period). Within the subprime market, grades
of A-, B, C, and D are assigned to represent progressively higher credit risks carrying
correspondingly higher interest rates. See WEICtER, supra note 16, at 17 (reporting that
subprime loans between the period 1996 to 1999 were on average three percentage points
higher than prime loans, but that larger variations between two to six percent existed among
grades of subprime loans).
19. WEICHER, supra note 16, at 67 (describing higher origination costs and higher
servicing costs associated with increased rates of delinquency and foreclosure). It remains
unclear, however, whether subprime loans accurately reflect an inherent market risk of default
associated with their borrowers or whether overly-costly subprime rates and points and fees
actually push borrowers unnecessarily over the brink of default or foreclosure.
20. Ken Zimmerman, Director of New Jersey Institute for Social Justice, Speech at the
Seton Hall Law School Predatory Lending Conference (June 17, 2003) (on file with authors).
21. See Glenn B. Canner et al., Recent Developments in Home Equity Lending, 84 FED.
RES. Buu. 241 (1998) (describing some of the benefits of home equity lending to
consumers), available at www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/1998/199804ead.pdf (Apr.
1998).
22. JOINT HUD-TREASURY REPORT, supra note 8, at 28-29.
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lending has continued its dramatic expansion, originating $200 billion in
mortgages in 2002 across the country. 2 3 New Jersey has witnessed
comparable growth. Between 1993 and 2000, the number of subprime loans
in New Jersey increased from 2693 to 25,403 and the percentage share of
subprime lending in the overall New Jersey mortgage market increased from
1% to 14%.24
The causes of this growth are complex and multifaceted. They include
the substantial increase in property values - and corresponding availability
2 5 the tax
of leveraged home equity - across the economic spectrum,
incentives created by the 1986 Tax Reform Act, which retained solely
mortgage interest as a category of tax-deductible consumer interest, 2 6 and
the emergence of nontraditional, nondepository mortgage service providers,
such as mortgage brokers, mortgage bankers, finance companies and even
home improvement contractors. 2 7 Perhaps the most important catalyst for
the growth of subprime lending, however, has been the correspondingly
accelerating process of securitizing subprime mortgages and selling them on
28
the secondary market.
This securitization process has created a long funding pipeline
connecting individual residential mortgage borrowers, loan originators
(including mortgage brokers, home improvement contractors and an
increasing variety of lending institutions), investment banks and investors of
all kinds. 29
On one end of this pipeline, a mortgage broker arranges financing for a
borrower from any number of mortgage lenders, such as finance companies,

23. ROBERT E. LITAN, AM. BANKERS ASS'N, UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: THE RISKS OF
PREMATURE STATE REGULATION OF PREDATORY LENDING 4 (2003), available at

http://www.aba.com/NR/rdonlyres/1FAE5B 14-C034-4FF7-8566-664FOBDEDEC/28934/
PredReport20093.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2004).
24. KEN ZmmumAN ET AL., NEw JERSEY INST. FOR SOC. JUSTICE, PREDATORY LENDING
IN NEw JERSEY: THE RISING THREAT TO Low-INCoME HOMEOWNERS 5-6 (2002), available at
http://www.njisj.org/ reports/predatoryjending.html (Feb. 2002).
25. Margo Saunders, The Increase in Predatory Lending and Appropriate Remedial
Actions, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 111, 119 (2002).
26. Mansfield, supra note 18, at 522.
27. JOINT HUD-TREASURY REPORT, supra note 8, at 39.
28. See Eggert, supra note 9, at 534-52. The percentage of subprime mortgages that
were securitized and sold on the secondary market increased from 32% in 1994 to 55% in
1998, before dropping to 37% in 1999. JOINT HUD-TREASuRY REPORT, supra note 8, at 4142, 42 tbl.3.4.
29. JOINT HUD-TREAStmY REPORT, supra note 8, at 37-38.
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mortgage bankers, banks, thrifts, or credit unions. 30 Mortgage brokers
typically charge points or fees for their services and thus make a commission
from the total loan amount at closing. 3 1 In addition, brokers frequently
negotiate with lenders to be paid a "yield spread premium," which represents
the difference between the lowest rate the lender proffers the broker to
extend to the borrower and the actual rate the broker extends to the
borrower. Home improvement contractors often also originate mortgages for
borrowers with pre-arranged lenders and are a significant source of abuse in
32
the subprime lending process.
Within this pipeline, an originating lender may hold a loan in its
portfolio, collecting monthly mortgage payments as they come due and
servicing the loan in all other respects. Most subprime lenders, however,
securitize their loans. That is, lenders pool a large group of loans with
similar risk grades together, securitize them, and through Wall Street
investment banks, sell them to a vast secondary market of loan purchasers
that includes institutional investors, mutual funds and pension funds.3 3 The
enormous growth of securitization has had an utterly transforming effect on
the mortgage market. Securitization has simultaneously fueled the growth of
subprime lending and the nontraditional - and comparatively underregulated
- brokers and finance companies that dominate the market. 34 By selling a
loan to the secondary market, a subprime lender does not need to wait to
receive monthly mortgage payments from the borrower. It thereby becomes
immediately free upon closing to finance a new subprime loan with the
proceeds of the sale of the earlier loan. 35 With each financing, a lender
collects points and fees and, with each sale to the secondary market, it can

30. Mortgage brokers now account for almost 50% of all subprime mortgage
originations. The Problem, Impact and Responses: Hearing on PredatoryMortgage Lending
Before Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. (n.p.) (2001)

(statement of Neill Fendly, Immediate Past President, Nat'l Ass'n of Mortgage Brokers),
available at http://www.senate.gov/-banking/01-07hrg/072701/fendly.htm (July 27, 2001).
Brokers are heavily undercapitalized and, as a result, rarely use their own funds to extend a
loan. JOINT HUD-TREASURY REPORT, supra note 8, at 39 n.2. Rather, they will typically close
the loan in the lender's name; use "table funding" provided by a pre-designated purchaser of
the loan; or access a line of credit from a finance company. Eggert, supra note 9, at 538.
31. JOINT HUD-TREASURY REPORT, supra note 8, at 40.
32. See infra text accompanying notes 84-85.
33. JOINT HUD-TREASURy REPORT, supra note 8, at 37.
34. Eggert, supra note 9, at 546.
35. Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 1274.
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collect an interest point spread which represents the difference between the
36
rate charged to the borrower and the rate offered to investors.
The secondary market seems highly enamored of subprime lending
because the rates of return are enormously profitable given the overall risk
profile of subprime borrowers. 37 As an added benefit to secondary market
investors, and as described below, the secondary market can take advantage
of the Holder in Due Course doctrine, 38 which generally immunizes them, as
good faith purchasers, from liability for any fraud perpetrated by a loan
39
originator.
B. The Predominanceof Subprime Lending in Minority Communities
Subprime lending is concentrated among low and moderate-income
borrowers due in part to their typically lower income-to-asset ratios and
shorter or weaker credit histories. 4 0 More troubling, however, is the
remarkable predominance of subprime lending in African-American
neighborhoods. Nationwide, 50% of all loans in predominantly AfricanAmerican neighborhoods are subprime, compared to only 9% in
36. Mansfield, supra note 18, at 532.
37. See LrrAN, supra note 23, at 7; see also Hearing Before the House Comm. on
Banking and Fin. Servs., 106th Cong. 10 (2000) [hereinafter Mansfield Testimony] (testimony
of Cathy Lesser Mansfield) (arguing that many subprime loans carry unjustified and
"tremendously inflated costs"); Peter Zorn, Subprime Lending: An Investigation of Economic
Efficiency (Freddie Mac Dec. 21, 2000) (concluding that within the category of A-rated
borrowers, subprime loans charged an additional 100 basis points - after discounting heavily
for higher default risk and servicing cost - that could not be attributed to borrower credit risk).
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency concluded, however, that earnings of subprime
lenders are generally in line with underlying supply and demand fundamentals. COMPTROLLER
OF THE CURRENCY ADM'R OF NAT'L BANKS, ECONOMIC ISSUES IN PREDATORY LENDING 15

(Office of Comptroller of the Currency, Working Paper, 2003) [hereinafter OCC Working
Paper], availableat www.occ.treas.gov/workingpaper.pdf (July 30, 2003). The conclusions of
the OCC Working Paper have themselves come under severe criticism. See, e.g., NAT'L
CONSUMER LAw CTR. Er AL., COMMENTS TO THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER OF CURRENCY,

BANKING AcTIvrrIEs AND OPERATIONS; REAL ESTATE LENDING AND APPRAIsALs (2003), at
http://www.naca.net/CommentsOCCNatBnkPreempt.pdf (Oct. 6,2003).
38. See generally U.C.C. § 3-302 (2003); infra Part II.E.
39. See infra text accompanying notes 119-23.
40. DEP'T OF Hous. AND URBAN DEv., UNEQUAL BURDEN: INCOME AND RACIAL
DISPARITIES IN SUBPRIME LENDING IN AMERICA 3 (2000) [hereinafter UNEQUAL BURDEN].
According to this HUD study of 1998 HMDA data, 26% of refinance loans in low-income
neighborhoods were subprime compared to a national average of 11% and to 7% in upper
income neighborhoods. Id. In New Jersey, 60% of lending in low-income areas is subprime.
PREDATORY LENDING IN NEw JERSEY, supra note 24, at 6.
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predominantly white neighborhoods. 4 1 Controlling for income, the racial
disparity becomes even more stark: upper income African-Americans are
twice as likely as low income white borrowers to receive subprime credit. 4 2
In New Jersey, controlling for income and other key variables, AfricanAmericans are more than 3 times as likely as white borrowers to receive a
subprime home equity loan; they are 2.5 times as likely as white borrowers
to receive a subprime purchase money loan to buy a house; finally, they are
1.4 times as likely as white borrowers to receive a subprime refinance
loan. 4 3 These disturbing statistics indicate that much subprime lending is not
accurately correlated to credit risk and suggests that a significant portion of
subprime lending is predatory: that is, it charges far too high a price for the
credit risk presented by an individual borrower. 4 4
C. The Link Between the Subprime Market and PredatoryLending
As mentioned, the large majority of subprime loans should not, on its
own, be considered predatory. However, certain lending practices, when
done in connection with an already expensive subprime loan, are so abusive
that they can only be described as predatory. One core feature that these
abusive practices have in common is their tendency to strip equity from a
borrower without her informed consent. 4 5 Typical equity stripping practices
finance unnecessary charges along with a loan and thereby decrease the
value of the borrower's ownership interest in her home. 4 6 As a result,
victims of predatory lending lose their primary - perhaps their only - source
of wealth accumulation. In addition, unnecessarily high rates and fees render
many unable to consistently make their loan payments and burden them with
an unreasonable risk of losing their homes entirely. 4 7
These practices, it should be noted, are rarely present in the
conventional lending industry. Indeed, they are present only in the predatory
subset of the subprime lending market - a subset that has captured a
significant share of the subprime market and appears resistant to competition
from the legitimate lending market for a variety of reasons. The most
fundamental reason is that predatory lenders actively prey on potential
41. UNEQuAL BuRDEN, supra note 40, at 3.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
ZnMmuRwi ET AL., supra note 24, at 7.
See infra text accompanying notes 54-57.
STEIN, supra note 5, at 4.
Id. at 4-5.
Id. at 4.
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victims: they employ unique, aggressive and often highly misleading
marketing and sales techniques. 4 8 In order to identify potential victims,
predatory lenders may search census records to look for predominantly
African-American tracts, and/or deed records; to identify persons that either
own their homes outright or should have substantial equity in them. They
also search tax records to identify delinquent persons who may be in need of
money. 4 9 Predatory lenders and brokers then rely on direct marketing
techniques, such as persistent calling or "live checks," which are full of
misleading enticements that have proven to be effective with the most
vulnerable homeowners. These homeowners tend to be very unsophisticated
about mortgage products and largely disconnected from the financial
services market. 50 Legitimate subprime and conventional lenders do not, as
a matter of course, engage in such aggressive marketing techniques. They
tend to attract borrowers who both need credit and are sophisticated enough
to price and compare their options. 5 1
As one self-confessed predatory lender described in testimony to the
U.S. Senate, predatory lenders target "blue-collar workers, people who have
not gone to college, older people who are on fixed incomes, non-English52
speaking people and people who have significant equity in their homes."
Moreover, once a predatory lender has secured a victim, his goal is to keep
returning in order to repeatedly flip - refinance - the victim's loan, churning
additional fees and stripping additional equity each time. 5 3 However, once a
borrower has been trapped in an equity-stripping loan, her loan-to-value
ratio is likely too high to ever allow her to trade up to legitimate subprime
financing.
48. ASS'N OF CMTY. ORGS. FOR REFORM Now (ACORN), SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL:
PREDATORY LENDING IN AMERICA 34-35 (2002) [hereinafter SEPARTE AND UNEQUAL],
available at http://www.acom.org/acomI0/predatorylending/plreports/SU2002/main.pdf
(Nov. 2002).
49. Id.
50. Id.; see also Eggert, supra note 9, at 516.
51. Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 1289-90.
52. Equity Predators:Stripping, Flipping and Packing Their Way to Profits: Hearing
Before the Senate Special Comm. on Aging, 105th Cong. (n.p.) (1998) [hereinafter Testimony
of Jim Dough] (statement of "Jim Dough," Anonymous Employee, Finance Co.) ("[M]y
perfect customer would be an uneducated widow who is on a fixed income - hopefully from
her deceased husband's pension and social security - who has her house paid off, is living off
of credit cards, but having a difficult time keeping up her payments, and who must make a car
payment in addition to her credit card payments."), available at http://aging.senate.govl
events/hrl4jd.htm (Mar. 16, 1998).
53. See infra text accompanying notes 72-75.
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Some of the most common and most damaging equity-stripping or
otherwise unreasonable lending practices are:
1. Lending without Regard to Ability to Repay
Predatory lenders often make a loan based upon the value of the equity
that the borrower has in the home, but without concern for whether the
borrower has enough income to support monthly mortgage payments. The
practice is sometimes referred to as "asset-based lending." 54 This practice
predictably sets up a borrower for default and eventual loss of her home.
Though foreclosure is typically costly and disfavored by legitimate mortgage
lenders, 5 5 participants in the predatory lending pipeline may be unconcerned
with the likelihood of foreclosure on these loans because they have already
received their benefit. Mortgage brokers will have received a commission at
the outset from the loan proceeds (and have been known to exaggerate a
borrower's credentials when presenting an application for lender approval);
a lender can then immediately securitize and sell the loan to the secondary
market and recover the value of the loan immediately; and the secondary
market investor can still recoup losses because the asset-based lending is
typically directed at borrowers who already have substantial equity in their
homes. 56 As we shall see below, HOSA does not expressly address this
57
practice.
2. Financing Excessive Points and Fees
Points and fees charged in connection with predatory loans routinely
amount to between 5% and 8% of the loan amount. 5 8 Points and fees can
become even costlier because they are not paid in cash by the borrower but,
rather, frequently are financed as part of the total loan amount. As a result, a
subprime borrower will pay the already high interest rate associated with her

54. JOINT HUD-TREAsuRy REPORT, supra note 8, at 76.
55. WFICHER, supra note 16, at 84.
56. Eggert, supra note 9, at 550-60.
57. See infra text accompanying notes 240-43.
58. STIN, supra note 5, at 7 (estimating that 750,000 loans annually have points and
fees that are in excess of 5% of the total loan value); see also SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL, supra
note 48, at 37 (reporting that borrowers in predatory loans are "routinely" charged just under
8% of the loan amount in points and fees). By contrast, the average points and fees charged on
conventional loans, if any are charged, is 1.1%. Id.
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loan to finance the points and fees. 59 Financing points and fees can be
dangerous because their costs are not transparent; such financing tends to
obscure the true cost of the loan, particularly when many borrowers do not
find out about the financing process until the closing.6 0 Financing of points
and fees can be particularly abusive when combined with other equity
stripping devices such as loan flipping, which is described below.
3. Prepayment Penalties
Prepayment penalties are charges a borrower must pay if she wishes to
pay off or refinance a loan, either through the same lender or a different one,
before the end of the loan term. 6 1 Prepayment penalties are virtually
nonexistent in the prime industry due to competition. 62 Seventy percent of
loans in the subprime market, however, contain prepayment penalties of
approximately 5% of the total loan amount. 63 Because prepayment penalties
in a refinance are typically financed as part of the new loan rather than paid
at closing, they drive up the cost of the new loan and thereby deplete a
borrower's equity. 6 4 They are particularly objectionable where, as is
frequently the case, a borrower was not aware of the prepayment provision
in her initial loan. 6 5 Because an existing New Jersey statute generally
prohibits the imposition of prepayment penalties in connection with
residential mortgages, 6 6 HOSA does not directly limit the imposition of

59. Mansfield Testimony, supra note 37 ("[Tihe combination of high points and fees in
a refinance loan and high rates translate into exorbitantly higher costs for the borrower - much
higher than they would be if the borrower were lent the second mortgage or unsecured credit
product he/she sought in the first place.").
60. STEIN, supra note 5, at 4; see also Zimmerman, supra note 20.
61. JoINT HUD-TREAsuRY REPORT, supra note 8, at 94-95; DEBBIE GoLDsTEIN & STACY
SaRonAUtn SON, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, WHY PREPAYMENT PENALTIES ARE ABUSIVE
IN SuBPRImE HOME LOANS (2003), available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/

PPPPolicyPaper2.pdf (Apr. 2, 2003).
62. Joshua Brockman, Fannie Revamps Prepayment-PenaltyBonds, Mortgage-Backed
Securities Letter, July 26, 1999, at 16 (noting that in conventional conforming market
prepayment penalties are assessed on less than two percent of borrowers).
63. JOINT HUD-TREASURY REPORT, supra note 8, at 92.
64. COST OF PREDATORY LENDING, supra note 5, at 9 (estimating that prepayment
penalties on subprime loans cost U.S. borrowers $2.3 billion a year); see also GOLDSTEIN &
SON, supra note 61, at 5.
65. GOLDSTEIN & SON, supra note 61, at 4.
66. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-1 to -11.1 (West 2003). But see Shinn v. Encore
Mortgage Servs., Inc., 96 F. Supp. 2d 419 (D.N.J. 2000) (holding that the Federal Alternative
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prepayment penalties. HOSA does, however, indirectly address the issue by
putting a cap on the number of points that can be refinanced in connection
with high cost loans.
4. Packing Single Premium Insurance Products
Predatory lenders often "pack" unnecessary and costly insurance
products to pay off the borrower's loan in the event of sickness, disability or
death, into subprime loans and finance them without the borrower's
informed consent. 6 7 Unlike traditional insurance premiums, which are paid
on a monthly basis, subprime mortgage insurance products are frequently
sold as "single premium" in which five years worth of premiums are paid up
front in one lump sum and financed over the (usually longer) term of the
loan. Such financing of single premium credit insurance is estimated to cost
up to four to five times as much as does unfinanced credit insurance paid
periodically by the borrower 6 8 and is rarely properly disclosed to the
borrower. 69 Indeed, leading consumer advocacy groups consider the

Mortgage Transactions Parity Act of 1982 preempts section 46:10B-1 as to adjustable rate
mortgages, thereby allowing the imposition of prepayment penalties for such mortgages).
67. N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 46:10B-2 ("Prepayment of a mortgage loan may be made by or
on behalf of a mortgagor at any time without penalty."). The New Jersey prepayment statute
is preempted as to federal savings associations, which may impose prepayment penalties. 12
C.F.R. § 545.2 (2004) (preempting state laws addressing operations of federal savings
associations); id. § 560.34 (authorizing federal savings associations to impose prepayment
penalties). The New Jersey prepayment statute is also preempted as to national credit unions,
but they may not impose prepayment penalties under their own regulations. Id. § 701.21(b)
(preempting state laws addressing terms of repayment for national credit union loans); 12
U.S.C. §1757(5)(A)(viii) (2000) (barring national credit unions from imposing prepayment
penalties). The New Jersey prepayment statute is preempted as to national banks, which may
charge non-interest fees, such as prepayment penalties. 12 C.F.R. § 7.4002(d) (preempting
state laws that limit or prohibit charges by national banks); id. § 7.4002(a) (allowing national
banks to charge non-interest fees). Prior to July 1, 2003, the New Jersey prepayment statute
was also preempted as to state-chartered housing creditors. Compare id. § 560.220, with 12
C.F.R. § 560.220 (2002); see 67 Fed. Reg. 76,304 (2002) (delaying effective date of revision
of § 560.220 from January 1, 2003 to July 1, 2003); see also Glukowsky v. Equity One, Inc.,
848 A.2d 747 (N.J. 2004) (finding, in dicta, that revised section 560.220 does not preempt
section 46:10B-2 of the New Jersey Statutes Annotated as to state-chartered housing
creditors).
68. SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL, supra note 48, at 42. In addition, lenders have strong
incentives to pack such insurance products because they receive an average of 30%
commission from the insurance company on the sale. STEIN, supra note 5, at 7.
69. STEIN, supra note 5, at 6.
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financing of single premium credit insurance to be nothing less than a "ripoff."7 0

5. Loan Flipping
Loan flipping refers to the practice of repeatedly refinancing a
borrower's loan (typically within the first few years of the loan term) with a
fee-loaded loan, without reasonable benefit to the borrower. 7 1 Subprime
borrowers are frequently solicited to refinance by predatory lenders with
assurances that their monthly payments will be lower (by extending the loan
term) or with suggestions that they could use cash to consolidate other
consumer debts. The refinancings typically contain high points and fees as
well as prepayment penalties, which provide additional revenue to lenders
and brokers, but materially deplete the equity that borrowers retain in their
homes. 7 2 Flipping depends on the skill and confidence of individual lender
representatives or brokers, who are persistent in winning the trust of
consumers and otherwise assuring them that the time is especially right to
take advantage of refinancing. 7 3 Indeed, loan flipping is a core weapon in
the predatory lenders' arsenal. A predatory lender's ultimate goal is to lock a
borrower into one abusive loan, and return over and over to the borrower to
siphon equity out of her home and into their own pockets. 7 4 Once a
70. CONSUMER FED'N OF AM. AND CTR. FOR ECON. JUSTICE, CREDIT INSURANCE
OVERCHARGES HIT $2.5 BILLION ANNUALLY (2001), availableat http:lwww.consumerfed.org/
credins.pdf (Nov. 2001); CONSUMERS UNION & CTR. FOR ECON. JUSTICE, CREDIT INSURANCE:
THE $2 BILLION A YEAR Rip-OFF (1999), available at http://www.consumersunion.org/

pdf/credit.pdf (Mar. 1999).

71.

JOINTHUD-TREAsURY REPORT, supra note 8, at 75.
72. For example, in Cammarano v. Associates, Civ. No. F-13509-97 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 1997), a woman obtained a $28,000 home equity loan from Associates. After Ms.
Cammarano had difficulty making her payments, Associates initiated contact with her and
refinanced the loan three times in two years, increasing her total indebtedness to $56,000,
which was primarily comprised of refinanced points and fees. Id.
73. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 9, at 1283 ("Predatory lenders . . . endear
themselves with charm and guile. They consciously exude an aura of expertise and success,
intimidating customers from questioning the advisability of the loans they are offering.").
74. See, e.g., Testimony of Jim Dough, supra note 52. Jim Dough also testified that
predatory finance companies
require branch employees to make contact every three months with customers to
prevent payoffs and up-sell to bigger loans. At some of my branches, we tried to call
every one of our real estate customers at least once a month. The purpose of these
contacts was to flip as many loans as possible. Our tactic was to try to gain the trust
and confidence of the customer.
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borrower is trapped in this equity-depleting cycle, it becomes increasingly
difficult to escape through refinancing with a legitimate lender on favorable
terms.
6. Balloon Payments, Advance Payments, Default Interest Rates and
Discretionary Call Provisions
Traditionally, a balloon payment is a lump sum payment that is due near
the end of the fixed loan repayment term, and which pays off the remainder
of a borrower's unpaid principle.7 5 In the predatory market, unlike in the
conventional market, a balloon payment may come due after a very short
period - frequently within three to five years - and therefore represent an
amount nearly equal to the original principal balance. 76 Victims of predatory
lending are often either deceived about the existence of a balloon provision
in their loan or are falsely reassured that they could simply refinance this
exorbitant balloon payment at a lower rate in the future. In fact, predatory
lenders will use an impending balloon payment to coerce the borrower to
refinance the loan - i.e. flip the borrower - so that the lender can extract
77
additional points and fees.
Advance payment provisions require that borrowers prepay a certain
amount of interest at closing that would otherwise be payable over the
course of the loan. 7 8 Default interest rate provisions substantially increase
the interest rate owed upon any default - sometimes by amounts up to 40%.
These provisions can be deeply unfair because they make it very difficult for
a borrower to cure a default; indeed, they position a borrower for a quick
foreclosure or refinancing at outrageous terms. 79 Call provisions allow
lenders to demand payment of the full loan amount at the lenders' sole
discretion and thereby offer lenders overwhelming leverage over
borrowers. 8 0 All three provisions are typically included without the
borrowers' knowledge or understanding. 8 1 These provisions also provide
75. JOINT HUD-TRaEsuRY REPORT, supra note 8, at 96.
76. Id.
77. SEPARATE AND UNEQuAL, supra note 48, at 41.
78. See NAT'L CONSUMER LAw CTR., STOP PREDATORY LENDING: A GuiDE FOR LEGAL
ADVOCATES 46 (2002) (noting that "[s]ome lenders collect these payments upfront at closing
to disguise the real amount of credit extended and to increase the consumer's obligation to
pay interest").

79.

NAT'L CONSUMER LAw CTR., TRUTH IN LENDING §

TRUTH IN LENDING].
80. SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL, supra note

81. Id.

48,

at 40.

10.4.3 (4th ed. 1999) [hereinafter
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unscrupulous lenders with an opportunity to initiate contact and the leverage
to coerce borrowers to refinance with another high-fee loan so as to avoid
the application of the abusive terms.
7. Negative Amortization
Most loans amortize over the life of the loan with a resultant diminution
of principal. Negative amortization, by contrast, is a type of loan structure in
which the monthly payments do not even cover interest charges, causing the
82
principal to increase - rather than decrease - over the life of the loan.
Because negative amortization causes a borrower to steadily lose equity each
month, it is virtually never in a borrower's interest to accept such a loan
term. Not surprisingly, however, many borrowers report that their lenders
83
did not explain how such a loan structure would work.
8. Home Improvement Contractor Abuse
Unscrupulous home improvement contractors frequently pass through
poor and minority neighborhoods looking for homes that are in disrepair and
therefore susceptible to a home-improvement pitch. 84 The contractors will
offer to arrange financing with a pre-arranged lender who agrees to pay the
contractor directly from the loan proceeds. Because the borrower is not
directly paying the contractor, the borrower has no leverage over the timing
or quality of the contractor's work. As a result, these contractors can walk
away with substantial payments, leaving the promised repairs unfinished,
shabbily done or even unattempted, abandoning the borrower with an
85
unwanted and abusive home equity loan from the complicit lender.
D. PredatoryLending's Wake: An Epidemic of Foreclosures
Predatory lending has real, measurable negative consequences, which
are significantly more than those associated with other types of consumer
fraud. The practice has precipitated a rash of foreclosures in New Jersey,
causing devastating financial and emotional harm to individual victims,
particularly those in low-income and minority neighborhoods where
predatory practices are concentrated. For example, in Essex County, New
82. JoINT HUD-TREAsuRY

REPORT,

supra note 8, at 91.

83. SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL, supra note 49, at 41.

84. Id. at 39.
85. JOINT HUD-TREAsURY REPORT, supra note 8, at 39.
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Jersey, the number of residential foreclosures increased from 1701 in 1995
to 2516 in 2000, as the percentage share of those foreclosures attributable to
subprime loans increased from 18.8% to 29.6%.86 Significantly, the data
appear to demonstrate that foreclosures have not merely tracked the increase
in overall subprime lending, but rather that subprime and predatory lending
have prematurely caused disproportionately greater numbers of foreclosures.
For example, between 1995 and 2000, the rate of subprime foreclosures was
double the rate of subprime originations in northern New Jersey counties.8 7
At the same time, the speed at which loans went into foreclosure - a result of
loans that were unmanageable from the start or were subject to serious
equity stripping practices - increased dramatically. The average age of a
loan in foreclosure dropped from 6.7 years in 1995 to 4.0 years half a decade
later.8 8 The highest concentrations of defaults are in largely AfricanAmerican sections of southern and western Newark, Irvington and East
Orange. 89
A foreclosure on a residential home puts a family through a period of
devastating emotional and financial distress. 9 0 In addition, when
foreclosures are concentrated in particular neighborhoods, once-healthy
communities suffer from the externalities associated with largely abandoned
tracts of land: a decrease in overall property values, an increase in crime,
and a corresponding need for greater law enforcement and other government
91
services.
86. ZBplRmAN ET AL., supra note 24, at 8. In the first half of 2001, foreclosures
increased an additional 15%. Id. According to the study, these figures are significantly
understated because they do not take into account foreclosures accomplished by secondary
holders of mortgage notes, which represent approximately half of all subprime mortgage note
holders. Id.
87. Id.; cf. JOINT CTR. FOR Hous. STuDms, HARvARD UNIv., CREDIT, CAPrrAL AND
CoMMuNmES:

THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE CHANGING MORTGAGE BANKING INDUSTRY FOR

COMMUNITY BASED ORGANIZATIONS (2004) ("Best available data suggest that in 2002,
subprime loans had a serious delinquency rate of 10.44 percent, nearly 20 times higher than
the rate for prime conventional loans."), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/
publicationscommunitydevelopment/ccco4-1.pdf (Mar. 9, 2004).
88. ZIMMERMANETAL, supra note 24, at 6, 8.
89. Id. at 8.
90. WEICHER, supra note 16, at 84 (acknowledging that the consequences of home
foreclosure can be tragic, such as the loss of a home that may represent all the assets of a
family, the necessity of uprooting the family and moving to a less desirable residence); Eggert,
supra note 9, at 581 (describing the range of devastating emotions and problems encountered
by families subjected to home foreclosure).
91. Ayse Can, GIS and Spatial Analysis of Housing and Mortgage Markets, 9 J. Hous.
RES. 61, 68 (1998), available at http://www.fanniemaefoundation.org/programs/jhr/pdf/
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The explosion of foreclosures caused by predatory lending appears more
lamentable when one considers that the vast majority of victims of predatory
lending already owned their homes. Over 80% of subprime lending - the
market within which predatory lending occurs - is not for the purchase of a
home but, rather, primarily for cash-out refinancings or to consolidate preexisting consumer debt. 9 2 Thus, many homeowners are losing their houses
because new and complex forms of consumer debt products, secured by
mortgages on their home, have been sold to them on utterly unreasonable
93
and confusing terms.
E. The Limitations of Pre-HOSA Remedies
In enacting HOSA, New Jersey recognized that the phenomenon of
predatory lending was too broad and persistent to be controlled by existing
remedies. New Jersey tort remedies typically reach only outright
misrepresentation by lenders. Federal disclosure statutes, such as the Truth
in Lending Act (TILA),9 4 remain ineffective in warning borrowers about all
the pitfalls of predatory loans. Finally, the federal high cost home loan
statute upon which HOSA builds - the HOEPA 9 5 - encompasses too few
home loans within its regulatory scope to have much impact on the predatory
lending phenomenon. Moreover, much of the effectiveness of these remedies
is actually eliminated by the Holder in Due Course doctrine, which largely
insulates good faith purchasers of predatory loans from liability for the
illegal conduct of such loans' originators. As described below, HOSA
increases loan disclosure requirements, bolsters current consumer fraud
protections in the home loan area, supplements protections for classes of
high cost loans and, very importantly, eliminates in many cases the liability
barriers posed by the Holder in Due Course doctrine.

jhr 0901.can.pdf (last visited May 24, 2004); Equity Predators: Stripping, Flipping and
Packing Their Way to Profits: Hearing Before the Senate Special Committee on Aging, 105th
Cong. 105-18 (1998) (statement of William J. Brennan, Jr., Director, Home Defense Program
of the Atlanta Legal Aid Society, Inc.), available at http://aging.senate.gov/eventsl
hrl4wb.htm (Mar. 16, 1998).
92. Of the 80% of subprime loans that are used for refinancing, 59% are cash-out loans.
JoiNT HUD-TREASURY REPORT, supra note 8, at 31.
93. Mansfield Testimony, supra note 37 (emphasizing that a large proportion of
subprime foreclosures result from subprime debt consolidation refinancings that were
misunderstood by the borrower, were not really needed or were issued on unfair terms).
94.
15 U.S.C. § 1602 (2000).
95.
§ 1601.
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1. Pre-HOSA Remedies
The New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (CFA), 9 6 though considered one
of the most consumer-friendly statutes in the nation, 97 only applies to
misrepresentations, material omissions, or overall unconscionable conduct. 9 8
While such conduct is obviously present in many predatory loans (though
notoriously difficult to prove), the CFA does not appear to specifically
prohibit common predatory practices such as asset-based lending, loan
flipping, insurance fee packing, and financing excessive points and fees in a
consistent or predictable manner - particularly in the absence of proof of
fraud or deception.9 9 In addition, claims under the CFA cannot be asserted
against the substantial number of secondary market holders of predatory
mortgage notes (at least in the absence of actual or constructive knowledge),
either as an affirmative claim or as a defense to foreclosure because the
Holder in Due Course doctrine immunizes a good faith purchaser of a note
from most claims that could have been asserted against a loan originator, no
matter how meritorious the underlying claim. 100
The Federal Truth in Lending Act mandates certain important
disclosures in connection with a home loan including the annual percentage
rate (APR), the total amount financed which must include a calculation of
points and fees charged, and the monthly payment amount and number of
payments necessary to pay off the loan entirely. 10 1 It authorizes actual
damages, statutory damages of double the finance charge and attorneys fees
for any violations. 102 However, in the fight against predatory lending, TILA
offers too little too late. It fails to include more obvious and less technical
disclosures that traditionally unsophisticated victims of predatory lending
need. In addition, the disclosures that TILA does require need only be made
at the loan closing when a borrower has already psychologically

96.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2 (West 2001).
97.
Cox v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 647 A.2d 454, 460-61 (N.J. 1994) (noting that New
Jersey has "one of the strongest consumer protection laws in the nation" and that it "should be
construed liberally in favor of consumers"). The Consumer Fraud Act mandates treble
damages and attorneys fees. § 56:8-19.
98.
Lemelledo v. Beneficial Mgmt. Corp. of Am., 674 A.2d 582 (N.J. 1996).
99.
Cf Assocs. Home Equity Servs. v. Troup, 778 A.2d 529, 544 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2001) (holding that defendants raised genuine issues of material fact regarding
unconscionability of residential mortgage terms in Consumer Fraud Act counterclaim).
100. See infra text accompanying notes 118-24.
101.
15 U.S.C. § 1638 (2000).
102. § 1640(a)(I)-(3).
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committed. 10 3 The disclosures are also too confusing where they come
included in a bewildering stack of loan documents. In sum, TILA is not
sufficient, standing alone, to warn vulnerable borrowers about the true costs
of a loan.
Finally, in 1994, Congress enacted HOEPA, an amendment to TILA,
which places direct limits on certain practices if made in connection with a
"high cost loan." 104 Specifically, HOEPA protections apply if a loan meets
one of two high cost loan triggers: (i) the "rate trigger" or "APR trigger,"
where the APR exceeds by 8% the yield on Treasury securities of
comparable maturity for first lien loans (or above 10% for subordinate lien
loans); or (ii) the "fee-trigger," where the total of the loan's points and fees
exceeds 8% of the loan total or $400 (adjusted for inflation), whichever is
greater. 105 Regulation Z, promulgated under HOEPA by the Federal Reserve
Board, specifies which charges count as points and fees for purposes of the
fee trigger and includes compensation to a mortgage broker in the form of a
yield spread premium; 10 6 after recent amendments to Regulation Z, optional
10 7
credit insurance is also included in the calculation of points and fees.
HOEPA prohibits the inclusion in high cost loans of certain loan terms
that tend to be abusive. For such high cost loans, HOEPA prohibits negative
amortization without exception, 10 8 balloon payments on loans with terms of
less than five years, 10 9 loan terms that increase the interest rate in the event
of a default, 1 10 and prepayment penalties in certain cases for financially
vulnerable borrowers. 11 1 HOEPA creditors are prohibited from engaging in
103. Christopher L.Peterson, Truth, Understanding,and High-Cost Consumer Credit:
The HistoricalContext of the Truth In Lending Act, 55 FLA. L. REv. 807, 898 (2003).
104. 15 U.S.C. § 1601.
105. § 1602(aa)(1), (3); 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(a)(1)(i) (2002). The fee trigger was
lowered by the Federal Reserve Board in 2001 (with compliance mandatory by October 1,
2002), from 10% above comparable Treasury securities (for either first or second lien loans).
66 Fed. Reg. 65,606, 65,608-610 (Dec. 20, 2001).
106. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa)(4)(B); 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(b)(1)(ii).
107. 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(a)(1)(ii), (b)(1)(iv). Real estate charges such as title
insurance, filing and recording fees must also be included unless the charges are reasonable,
offer no direct or indirect compensation to the creditor, and are paid to a third party
unaffiliated with the creditor. § 226.32(b)(1)(iii).
108. 15 U.S.C. § 1539(f); 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(d)(2).
109. 15 U.S.C. § 1639(e); 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(c)(3), (d)(1) (Official Staff
Commentary). For loan terms that exceed five years, balloon payments are permissible, but
must be disclosed. Id. § 226.32(c)(3).
110. 15 U.S.C. § 1639(d); 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(d)(4).
15 U.S.C. § 1639(c)(1)(A); 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(d)(6). Prepayment penalties are
111.
the loan will not cause the borrower to pay more than 50% of his income
permitted only if: (i)
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asset-based lending - lending without regard to a borrower's ability to
pay 1 12 - but only if they have engaged in a "pattern or practice" of such
activity.1 13 Recent amendments to Regulation Z also place limits on loan
flipping: Creditors or their affiliates are forbidden from refinancing a
HOEPA-covered loan within a year, unless the refinancing is "in the
borrower's interest."1 14 Damages for violations of HOEPA include all those
available under TILA plus enhanced statutory damages in the amount of the
sum of all finance charges and fees paid by the consumer. 1 15
HOEPA's scope, however, is narrow in two important respects. First,
HOEPA does not cover purchase money mortgages (those used to purchase
1 16
homes) or open-end lines of credit (such as home equity lines of credit).
Moreover, as consumer advocates have been arguing for years, the HOEPA
high cost loan triggers are too high. Predatory lenders are notoriously

to the monthly payments; (ii) income and expenses are verified by financial statements signed
by the consumer and supported by a credit report; (iii) creditor is not refinancing one of its
own or an affiliate's loans; (iv) if it occurs within the first five years of the loan; and (v) the
penalty is legal under state law. 15 U.S.C. § 1639(c).
112. § 1639(h). HOEPA defines this conduct as extending credit "based on the
consumer's collateral without regard to the consumers' repayment ability, including the
consumers' current and expected income, current obligations, and employment." Id.
113. Newton v. United Co. Fin. Corp., 24 F. Supp. 2d 444, 451 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
Traditionally, the pattern or practice element of the prohibition has been a hard one for
plaintiffs to satisfy, requiring proof of several instances of prohibited conduct in a short period
of time. Id. at 457. The recent amendments have loosened the requirement somewhat, creating
a presumptive violation where the lender has failed to document and verify the borrower's
ability to pay. 66 Fed. Reg. 65,606, 65,608-610 (Dec. 20, 2001) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
pt. 226).
114. 12 C.F.R. § 226.34(a)(3) (2003). In considering whether a refinancing is in the
borrower's interest, Regulation Z instructs lenders to consider the totality of the borrower's
circumstances at the time the credit was extended. Id. (Official Staff Commentary).
115. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a). HOEPA, like TILA, has a one-year statute of limitations for
affirmative suits, but can be raised any time - including against assignees - as a defense to
foreclosure. Id. § 1640(e).
116. Open-end credit is a credit extension where the exact amount of money lent or
advanced at any given time is not fixed. Id. § 1602(i). It is, in short, a line of credit. In order
to qualify as an open-end loan, TILA and Regulation Z require that creditors demonstrate that
their credit plan meets three specific elements. Id. A creditor under a plan: (i) must reasonably
contemplate repeated transactions; (ii) may impose a finance charge from time to time on an
outstanding unpaid balance; and (iii) generally replenishes the amount of credit available to
the consumer to the extent that any outstanding balance is repaid. Id.; 12 C.F.R.
§ 226.2(a)(20). Open-end lines of credit are being used to avoid HOEPA regulation. TRuTH IN
LENDING, supra note 80, at § 9.2.4.3.
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successful at offering loans with rates or points and fees just below the high
17
HOEPA triggers and thereby evading regulation. 1
2. Holder in Due Course Doctrine's Elimination of Assignee Liability
A significant limitation on remedies available to victims of predatory
lending is the Holder in Due Course doctrine, codified in the Uniform
Commercial Code. 1 18 The doctrine insulates noteholders in the secondary
market from most defenses, including fraud-related ones, that the borrower
could have raised against the original creditor. 1 19 The Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) has fully abrogated the Holder in Due Course doctrine's
application to the sale of consumer goods; this abrogation makes the
doctrine unavailable to assignees of loans involving manufactured homes or
home improvements. 120 Similarly, HOEPA has abrogated the doctrine for
loans it covers, making good faith assignees potentially liable for all claims
and subject to all defenses a debtor could have raised against the loan
originator, unless the assignee can demonstrate that "a reasonable person
exercising ordinary due diligence" could not have determined that the loan
12 1
was covered by HOEPA.
Nevertheless, in the large category of non-HOEPA home purchase or
refinance loans that are sold to the secondary market, the Holder in Due
Course doctrine poses a substantial impediment to borrowers seeking redress
for predatory loans, and likewise renders them virtually helpless to contest
foreclosures of predatory loans brought by secondary market mortgage
noteholders. 122 As a result, the Holder in Due Course doctrine creates little
117. JOiNT HUD-TREAsuRY REPORT, supra note 8, at 84; TRUTH IN LENDING, supra
note 79, at § 10.1.1.
118. U.C.C. § 3-302 (2003). The rule applies to purchasers of mortgages if they are:
(1) a holder; (2) of a negotiable note; (3) who took the note for value; (4) in good faith; (5)
without notice of the defenses to the note. See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS,
UNIFORM COMMERcIAL CODE § 14-2 (4th ed. 1995).
119. The only "real" defenses that survive the protections for good faith noteholders
are severely limited. They include infancy, duress, lack of legal capacity illegality of
transaction, or fraud in the factum involving, for example, a forged signature. WHrrE AND
SUMMERS, supra note 118, § 14-10.

120. FTC Holder in Due Course Regulations, 16 C.F.R. § 433.2.
15 U.S.C. § 1641(d)(1). Due diligence requires that the purchaser examine all
121.
loan documentation required by TILA; the itemization of the amount financed; and any other
disclosures. TRUTH IN LENDING, supra note 79, § 10.7.2.

122. See Eggert, supra note 9, at 612-14 (discussing the substantial costs both
securitization and the Holder in Due Course Rule have imposed on borrowers in the subprime
mortgage market).
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incentive for the secondary market to police predatory practices of loan
originators. Consumer advocates have persistently argued, therefore, that
any effective remedy for predatory lending must include a provision that
imposes liability against assignees of abusive loans both to offer borrowers
protection against foreclosure and to force the secondary market to cut off
12 3
funding to predatory lenders.
III. THE NEW JERSEY HOME OWNERSHIP SECURITY ACT: ATTEMPTING TO
CURB THE WORST AND PROTECT THE BEST OF THE SUBPRIME MARKET

On May 1, 2003, Governor James McGreevey signed the New Jersey
Home Ownership Security Act (HOSA or the Act) into law. 12 4 It applies to
most New Jersey purchase money and home equity loans that close on or
after November 27, 2003.125 The stated purpose of the Act is to "encourage
lending at reasonable rates with reasonable terms" so as to strengthen the
viability of many communities and increase home ownership. 126 Modeled in
significant respects on HOEPA, HOSA is designed to accomplish this goal
by prohibiting certain mortgage lending terms and practices deemed either
categorically unjustifiable or abusive when made in connection with loans
that already have very high interest rates or points and fees. Consumer
advocates consider the Act a landmark measure that will protect New
Jersey's most financially vulnerable homeowners from predatory lenders and
offer a reprieve against the rash of unfair home foreclosures that are
concentrated in New Jersey's minority and low-income neighborhoods. 12 7

123. See, e.g., id. at 617:
[Tihe surest solution to the problem of predatory lending is to force the markets that
fund subprime lenders to police those lenders, and the surest way to force this private
policing effort is to ensure that the buyers of predatory loans bear any risk of loss
associated with the sharp practices by the lender, rather than having that loss borne by
the borrower.
124. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-22 to -35 (West 2003).
125. Id. § 46:1OB-35; see also id. § 46:1OB-31; H. ROBERT Tnu.MAN, N.J. DEP'T OF
BANKING AND INs., BuLLETIN No. 03-15 (2003), [hereinafter BULETIN No. 03-15], available
at http://www.state.nj.us/dobi/bulletins/blt03l 5.pdf (July 25, 2003).
126. § 46:10B-23(2)(b)-(c).
127. See, e.g., Ken Zimmerman & Linda Fisher, Progress in the Fight against
Predatory Lending, STAR-LEDGER, May 16, 2003, at 23; see also Editorial, Predatory
Lending, N.J. L.J., May 12, 2003, at 30 (describing the act as a "national model in state
legislative efforts to combat the range of abusive mortgage lending practices collectively
referred to as predatory lending"); MBANJ Backs Compromise, ORIGINATION NEWs, Apr.
2003, availableat http://www.acom.org/campaigns/ pc.php?p=21 11.
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Representatives of the subprime lending industry argue that the Act is
unnecessary in light of existing remedies and may even be
counterproductive, but nevertheless agree that the Act will significantly alter
subprime lending practices in the state. 12 8 Industry representatives also
argue that the Act is ambiguous and fails to give creditors sufficient
guidance as to how they should comply with the new law.129 The subprime
lending industry has looked to the New Jersey Department of Banking and
Insurance (DOBI) for additional guidance. But, while the New Jersey
legislature has given DOBI significant investigatory and enforcement
granted DOBI only limited regulatory
powers under the Act, 130 it has
13 1
authority to interpret the Act.
Indeed, DOBI has only been authorized to promulgate regulations to
effectuate the Act's provisions relating to: (i) mandatory disclosure notices
and loan counseling programs for prospective High Cost Home Loan
borrowers and (ii) additional consumer counseling and awareness programs
for all prospective Home Loan borrowers. 13 2 DOBI, notwithstanding its lack
of direct statutory authority, has issued bulletins to provide guidance to
potential creditors as to the meaning of a number of the Act's ambiguous

128. See, e.g., Jim Goryeb, Loan Law Is a Bad Risk for Jersey, STAR-LEDGER, May 9,
2003, at 31, available at 2003 WL 19921382.
129. See, e.g., GEOFFREY M. CONNOR Er AL., REED SMrrH, LLP, A.75 NEw JERSEY'S
NEw ANTI-PREDATORY LENDING LAW (2003), available at http:/lwww.reedsnith.comllibraryl
publicationView.cfm?itemid=33130 (May 8, 2003).
130. The Act provides DOBI with significant investigatory powers. See N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 46:10B-28(7)(a)-(c) (West 2003). It also provides DOBI with substantial remedial
powers for violations of the Act, including authority to: (1) impose civil penalties of up to
$10,000 for each offense; (2) suspend, revoke or refuse to renew any license issued by DOBI;
(3) remove a person responsible for a violation of the Act from her position; (4) order a
person to cease and desist from any violation of the Act; and (5) make restitution to borrowers
for damages, and any other conditions that the department deems necessary and appropriate.
Id. § 46:10B-28(7)(d)(l)-(6).
131. When the Act was initially pre-filed for introduction into the 2002 New Jersey
legislative session, it contained the language, "[tihe Commissioner of Banking and Insurance
shall promulgate regulations pursuant to the 'Administrative Procedure Act,' P.L. 1968, c.410
(C.52:14B-1 et seq.) necessary to effectuate the provisions of this act." S. 2187, 2001 Leg.,
209th Sess., § 12 (N.J. 2001) (emphasis added). This language clearly granted DOBI a broad
mandate to interpret the Act. The final version of the bill, however, was revised to limit the
scope of DOBI's interpretive authority to that "necessary to effectuate the provisions of
subsections f. and g. of section 5 and section 11 of this act."§ 46:1OB-35(14).
132. § 46:1OB-35(14).
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provisions. 13 3 While such guidelines are not binding, courts should view
them as persuasive authority, particularly given DOBI's mandate to protect
and educate "consumers and promote[] the growth, financial stability and
efficiency of" the banking industry. 134 Where DOBI's guidance is
inconsistent with the plain text of the Act, its authority is obviously
restricted.
A. The Act's Scope: Regulating Most Home Loans a Little, but High Cost
Home Loans a Lot
The Act designates three classes of loans - "Home Loans," "Covered
Home Loans" and "High Cost Home Loans" - and subjects creditors who
issue them, as well as the secondary market investors who purchase them, to
increasing levels of regulation. 13 5 The New Jersey legislature concluded that
the Act's prohibitions on practices associated with the extremely broad
category of Home Loans, such as financing single premium credit insurance
and encouraging borrowers to default, are per se unreasonable in the
residential mortgage context and can virtually never be economically
justified. 13 6 The legislature also appears to have recognized that High Cost
Home Loans (ones that have either very high rates or points and fees
structures) render borrowers increasingly susceptible to default and
foreclosure. 13 7 At the same time, High Cost Home Loans are typically
extended to low-income borrowers who are financially unsophisticated,
making them particularly vulnerable to the abuses of predatory lenders. 13 8
Accordingly, the Act bans numerous additional loan terms when made in
connection with High Cost Home Loans, such as balloon payments, negative
amortizations, and default interest rates, while also mandating clear

133. BuuEIN No. 03-15, supra note 125, at 1; HOLLY C. BAKKE, N.J. DEP'T OF
BANriNG AND INs., BuLLEm No. 03-30 (2003) [hereinafter BuLLETm No. 03-30], available
at http://www.mbaa.org/ state..update/2003/nj/bulletinO3-30.pdf (Nov. 18, 2003).
134.

N.J. DEP'T OF BANKING AND INs., MISSION STATEMENT, available at http://www.

state.nj.us/dobi/dobimiss.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2004). In addition, because the Act grants
DOBI powers to investigate and impose penalties for certain violations of the Act, see N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-28(7)(a)-(c), subprime lenders can rely upon DOBI Bulletins in
predicting how DOBI will interpret and enforce provisions of the Act. See BUuzEriN No. 0330, supra note 133, at 7.
135. § 46:10B-24(3).
136. See id.
137. Id.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 51-54.
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disclosures and, in certain cases, loan counseling. 13 9 Undoubtedly reflecting

a legislative compromise, the Act bans the particularly dangerous practice of
loan flipping for "Covered Home Loans," a category that is slightly broader
than High Cost Home Loans. 140
1. Application to Creditors
The Act governs only Home Loans made by "Creditors," defined as
those who extend consumer credit that is (i) subject to a finance charge or
(ii) payable by five or more installments and to whom the obligation is
payable at any time. 14 1 This definition appears intended to screen out
informal lenders, such as family members who do not extend "consumer
credit." Notably, the term "Creditor" also includes mortgage brokers, as well
as anyone "who directly or indirectly solicits, processes, places or negotiates
home loans for others," which ensures that all parties who are involved in
arranging financing are subject to its prohibitions and penalties. 14 2 It also
139. § 46:10B-26(5)(a)-(g).
140. § 46:10B-26(5).
141. §46:1OB-24(3) ("Creditor"). The term "Creditor" includes federal savings
associations and national banks. See infra note 146. The federal government, however, has
preempted application of HOSA to federal savings and loans and savings banks and appears
likely to preempt regulation of national commercial banks as well. Thirty-three percent of all
banking institutions operating in New Jersey are nationally or federally chartered and would
therefore not fall under HOSA regulation. N.J. DEP'T OF BANKING AND INS., PRIMARY
REGULATORS OF BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH OFFICES IN NEW JERSEY (2003), available at
http://www.state.nj.us/dobi/acrobat/primregs.pdf (June 30, 2003). There is no readily
available data as to what percentage of market share such federally chartered entities have in
the New Jersey mortgage market. HMDA year 2000 data, however, indicates that of the top 25
participants in New Jersey's home purchase and refinance market (which collectively
originate roughly 55% of all New Jersey residential loans), 10 of the banks and mortgagelending institutions are state-chartered and originate approximately 21.46%, or $6.754 billion,
in residential loans. INSIDE MORTGAGE FIN. PUBL'NS, INC., REGIONAL MORTGAGE MARKET
GUIDE 242 (2001).
142. § 46:10B-24(3) ("Creditor"). While including mortgage brokers within the
definition of "Creditor," the Act also provides a meaningful limitation for the scope of that
liability:
Notwithstanding any provision of this Act to the contrary, a mortgage broker shall be
liable under the provisions of this act only for acts performed by the mortgage broker
in the course of providing mortgage brokering services. However, a mortgage broker
may be held liable for acts performed by the mortgage broker outside the scope of
mortgage brokering services if the acts are related to the purchasing or the making of
a home loan and are otherwise prohibited under this Act.
Id. § 46: 1OB-33(12).
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ensures that those who finance - but do not arrange - Home Loans cannot
avoid regulation by assigning various lending tasks, such as solicitation and
origination, to different entities. 143 This broad definition of Creditor appears
to include home improvement contractors and manufactured home sellers
who have substantial involvement in arranging a Home Loan. 14 4
Significantly, federal regulatory agencies, the Office of Thrift Supervision
(OTS) and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), have
respectively concluded that many of HOSA's prohibitions are preempted as
to federal savings associations and national banks, as well as to the operating
subsidiaries of both categories of entities. 14 5
Thus, a mortgage broker acting qua mortgage broker is only liable for her own violations
of the Act and is not jointly and severally liable along with the Creditor for the Creditor's
actions. The Act also excludes from the definition of "Creditor" attorneys and title insurers
who are unaffiliated with the Creditor. Id. § 46: 1OB-24.
143. See Eggert, supra note 9, at 3 (describing how the lending industry structures
itself to avoid liability to borrowers).
144. See § 46: 1OB-24(3) ("Creditor").
145. See OTS Op. Chief Counsel P-2003-5, at 4 (2003) (opining that Federal Home
Owners' Loan Act (HOLA), 12 U.S.C. § 1461 (2000), preempts application of HOSA to
federal savings associations, their operating subsidiaries and their assignees), available at
http://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/56305.pdf (July 22, 2003); Press Release, Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Issues Final Rules on National Bank Preemption and
Visitorial Powers; Includes Strong Standard to Keep Predatory Lending out of National Banks
(Jan. 7, 2004) (noticing issuance of final rules that revise 12 C.F.R. parts 7 and 34 so as to
preempt application of state predatory lending laws to nationally chartered banks and their
operating subsidiaries), available at http:lwww.occ.treas.gov/scriptslNewsRelease.aspx?
Doc=ZN9I8H7T.xml. But see Hearing Before the House Comm. on Fin. Servs. Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigations, 108th Cong. 7 (2003) (testimony of AARP Board of Directors
member W. Lee Hammond) (arguing that OCC does not have authority to preempt state
predatory lending laws as to operating subsidiaries of national banks). The OCC has taken the
position that federal preemption of state predatory lending laws as to nationally chartered
banks will not dramatically increase predatory lending in New Jersey as few of those
institutions are subprime lenders, let alone predatory lenders. The OCC found that as far as
national banks are concerned, "there were 178 lenders whose business focus was subprime
mortgage lending in 2001. The majority, or 112 (63%), were independent mortgage
companies. Of the remaining lenders, 30 (17%) were non-bank affiliates and only 36 (20%)
were depository institutions or their direct subsidiaries." OCC Working Paper, supra note 37,
at 4. This position is somewhat undercut by the fact that nationally chartered banks have been
purchasing subprime lenders and operating them as subsidiaries. See, e.g., HSBC Holdings
PLC: Regulators, Shareholders Clear Household InternationalDeal, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31,
2003, at B4. This trend will increase the number of preempted institutions that make subprime
and predatory loans. Cf Letter from H. Robert Tillman, Director, N.J. Department of Banking
and Insurance, Division of Banking, to James E. Gilleran, Director, Office of Thrift
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2. Three Tiers of Home Loan Coverage
The Act classifies three types of residential mortgage loans and subjects
each to different levels of regulation. First, the Act defines very broadly the
category of "Home Loans." Home Loans are extensions of credit to
borrowers secured by either: (i) a mortgage or deed of trust on real estate for
a one- to six-family dwelling that is or will be occupied by the borrower as
her principal dwelling; or (ii) a security interest in a "manufactured
home" 14 6 that is or will be occupied by a borrower as her principal
dwelling. 147 Exceeding the scope of protections offered by HOEPA, the Act
also covers purchase money mortgages (mortgages for initial home
Supervision (Aug. 19, 2003) (inquiring as to how many subsidiaries of entities regulated by
OTS offer loans in New Jersey), available at http://www.state.nj.us/dobi/PressReleases/
otsletter082503.pdf.
While the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) has not explicitly held that
HOSA is preempted as to federal credit unions, it has promulgated regulations that preempt a
broad swath of state lending laws. 12 C.F.R. § 701.21(b) (2003). Moreover, it has issued an
opinion letter preempting Georgia's predatory lending law. NCUA Preemption of the Georgia
Fair Lending Act, NACU Op. Assoc. Gen. Counsel (Nov. 10, 2003), available at
3
2
http://www.ncua.gov/ref/opinion-letters/ OO _lettersl03-0412.htm.
Congress is also considering broadly preempting state predatory lending laws.
Representative Robert Ney (R-Ohio) proposed a bill on February 14, 2003, H.R. 833, called
the Responsible Lending Act. The Ney bill is designed to preempt state regulation of the
lending industry entirely. Ann McDonald, State Anti-Predatory Lending Laws: More Harm
than Help?, 8 Am.BANKER-BoND BUYER 9, at 40 (2003). In addition to providing one lending
standard for creditors, the bill is seen as an attempt to weaken the stronger protections that
some states, including New Jersey, have recently enacted in response to the rapid rise in
predatory lending. Consumer Group: Ney's 'Pre-Emption' Bill Goes Too Far, 27 AM.
BANKER-BOND BUYER 10 (2003). The Ney bill, as well as proposed amendments to RESPA,
FCRA and laws governing flood insurance and government-sponsored entity regulation,
which are set to expire this year, appear to be currently stalled in Congress. STEVE KERCH,
CBS MARKETWATCH, HILL CLIMBING: CONGRESSIONAL STALEMATE OVER KEY REALTY ISSuE
(2003), available at http://cbs. marketwatch.com (Oct. 24, 2003). Congressional
commentators predict little progress in the coming year. See id. More than likely, existing
legislation will be automatically renewed for a year, so that residential mortgage lending will
not become an issue in the 2004 election. Id.; see also Lew Sichelman, MBA Sees No Quick
Fixes, 28 NAT'L MORTGAGE NEws 1 (2003), available at 2003 WL 7687729.
146. While not defined in the Act, the category of manufactured homes appears to
include modular homes, panelized homes, pre-cut homes, and mobile homes. See
MANUFACTURED Hous. INST., THE DEFINITION OF A MANUFACTURED HOME, available at
74
http://www.manufacturedhousing.orgllib/showtemp-detail.asp?id= &cat=l (last visited Aug.
29, 2003).
147. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:1OB-24(3) (West 2003) ("Home Loan").
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purchases) and open-end lines of credit. 14 8 Like HOEPA, the Act excludes
"reverse mortgage transactions" from its regulatory scope. 14 9 The large
majority of residential mortgage loans in New Jersey would fall into the
Act's classification of Home Loans. By definition, Home Loans include the
more restrictive categories of "Covered Home Loans" and "High Cost Home
Loans," which are described below.
Second, the Act classifies a certain subset of Home Loans as "Covered
Home Loans." Covered Home Loans are defined by reference to a "points
and fees" trigger lower than that for High Cost Home Loans (defined
below), and therefore cover a greater proportion of high-fee loans. This
category comprises Home Loans where the total points and fees payable in
connection with the loan exceed: (i) 4% of the total loan amount for loans of
more than $40,000 or (ii) 4.5% of the total loan amount if it is $40,000 or
less or if it is insured by the Fair Housing Administration (FHA) or
guaranteed by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). 15 0 Excluded from
the definition of points and fees are conventional prepayment penalties or
not more than two "Bona Fide Discount Points" (each, a "Bona Fide
Discount Point"). 15 1 The definition of Covered Home Loans contains no cap
for the principal amount of such loans. 15 2 In addition, by definition, Covered
Home Loans include all High Cost Home Loans. 15 3
Finally, "High Cost Home Loans" are the narrowest and most heavily
regulated subset of loans. High Cost Home Loans require a principal amount

148. Open-end credit plans represent a credit extension where the exact amount of
money lent or advanced at any given time is not fixed. See 15 U.S.C. § 1602(i). Because
open-end home equity lines of credit have been increasingly utilized by borrowers, including
subprime borrowers, HOSA's express regulation of such loans is a significant increase of
scope over that of HOEPA. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
149. Reverse mortgage transactions are mortgages that reverse the direction of
payments. They are typically used by older homeowners, who can borrow against the
substantial equity in their homes to receive periodic cash payments. Repayment of the loan
amount is not required until the borrower transfers the dwelling, ceases to occupy it as a
primary residence or dies. See id. § 1602(bb).
150. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-24 ("Covered Home Loan") (West 2003).
151. Id. For example (excluding up to two Bona Fide Discount Points) a $100,000
Home Loan would be a Covered Home Loan if its points and fees were more than $4000; a
$10,000 Home Loan would be a Covered Home Loan if its points and fees were more than
$450; and a $100,000 VA or FHA Home Loan would be a Covered Home Loan if its points
and fees were more than $4500.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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of less than $350,000 (such amount to be adjusted annually) 154 and, like a
HOEPA-covered loan, an interest rate or points and fees that exceed a
specified threshold. 15 5 The interest rate threshold under HOSA is defined by
incorporating the APR triggers set by HOEPA and the Federal Reserve
Board's Regulation Z. 15 6 Thus, HOSA's interest rate trigger, like HOEPA's,
is 8% above the prevailing interest rate on a Treasury security of a
comparable maturity for first lien mortgages, and 10% above the prevailing
Treasury security rate for a second lien mortgage. 157 At the time HOSA was
enacted (May 1, 2003), a 20-year fixed interest Treasury security (the
relevant comparable security for a 30-year mortgage) carried an interest rate
of 4.93%.158 Accordingly, under both HOEPA and HOSA, only those loans
with an APR of 12.93% or higher would be classified and regulated as High
154. Id. The $350,000 threshold will be adjusted each year to include the last
published increase of the housing component of the national Consumer Price Index, New
York-Northeastern New Jersey Region. By way of example, that component increased four
percent from July 2002 to July 2003. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, NEW YORK-NORTHERN NEW
JERSEY CPI UP 0.4 PERCENT mi JuLY; 3.0 PERCENT INCREASE FROM YEAR AGO (2003),
availableat http://www.bls.gov/ro2/cpinynj.htm (last modified Dec. 16, 2003).
155. § 46:1OB-24(3).
156. Id. ("threshold" (1)); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa) (2000); 12 C.F.R. § 262.32
(2003). This determination is made without regard to whether the loan transaction is or may
be a "residential mortgage transaction." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:1OB-24(3) (West 2003)
("threshold"(1)); see also 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(24) (defining a "residential mortgage
transaction"). A residential mortgage transaction is a loan to finance the acquisition or initial
construction of a principal dwelling. Id. While such types of loans do not fall within the ambit
of HOEPA, they do fall within that of HOSA. Thus, HOSA, unlike HOEPA, applies to
purchase money and construction mortgages for primary dwellings.
157. See 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa)(1); 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(a)(1)(i). HOEPA's APR trigger
had been lowered by the Federal Reserve Board in 2001 (with compliance mandatory by
October 1, 2002), from a threshold of 10% (for both first and second lien loans) above
comparable Treasury securities. 66 Fed. Reg. 65,606, 65,608-610 (Dec. 20, 2001).
158. FED. RESERVE BD., FEDERAL RESERVE STA-ISTICAL RELEASE H.15 SELECTED
2
INTEREST RATES (2003), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/Releases/H15/200304 1
(Apr. 21, 2003) [hereinafter APRIL RATES]. The HOEPA and HOSA trigger for a first-lien
mortgage is eight points above "the yield on Treasury securities having comparable periods of
maturity to the loan maturity as of the fifteenth day of the month immediately preceding the
month in which the application for the extension of credit is received by the creditor." 12
C.F.R. § 226.32(a)(1)(i). Because the federal government has recently stopped issuing 30-year
Treasuries, the Federal Reserve Board staff has interpreted the Regulation Z trigger language
to mean that lenders should use the yield for 20-year constant maturities in place of the yield
for 30-year maturities. Id. §§ 226.32(a)(1)(i), 226.32(a)(1)(i)-(4)(iii). These yields may be
determined from the Board's "Selected Interest Rates" (statistical release H-15). Id.
§ 226.32(a)(l)(i)-(4).
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Cost Home Loans. 159 Indeed, the High Cost Home Loan APR threshold
averages approximately a full seven percentage points above the national
average interest rate of 5.7% for a fixed rate, 30-year home loan measured at
the time of HOSA's passage. 160 HOSA's APR trigger, therefore, covers a
narrow category of very expensive loans.
HOSA also contains a "total points and fees threshold" which triggers
designation as a High Cost Home Loan. 16 1 While HOEPA's points and fees
threshold is set fairly high at 8% of the total loan value, HOSA's points and
fees threshold is uniformly lower than HOEPA's.162 It employs a sliding
scale, allowing Creditors to charge higher points and fees - and avoid a
loan's "high cost" designation - for loans that have lower values. Under the
Act, the points and fees trigger is met where the borrower is charged, at loan
closing: (i) for total loan amounts of $40,000 or greater, 5% or more of the
total loan amount; (ii) for total loan amounts of $20,000 to $39,999, 6% of
the total loan amount; and (iii) for total loan amounts of $1 to $19,999, the
lesser of $1000 or 6%. 163 The Act specifically excludes from the calculation
of points and fees a "conventional prepayment penalty" 164 and up to two
Bona Fide Discount Points, as explained in detail below.

159. As the yield for 20-year constant maturities on April 15, 2003, was 4.93%, APRIL
supra note 158, the precise HOEPA rate trigger for a 30-year fixed interest loan for
which the creditor received the application on May 1, 2003 (the day the Act was signed) was
12.93%. 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(a)(1)(i).
RATES,

160.

See FREDDIE MAC, 2003 WEEKLY MORTGAGE RATES RELEASES (2003), available

at http://www.freddiemac.com/pnuns/pmms2003sum.htm (Sept. 4, 2003). The points and fees
national average for loans during that period was 0.6%. Id.
161. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-24 (West 2003) ("total points and fees threshold").
162. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa)(3).
163. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-24 (West 2003) ("total points and fees threshold"). For
example (excluding up to two Bona Fide Discount Points) a $100,000 Home Loan would be a
High Cost Home Loan if its points and fees were $5000 or more; a $30,000 Home Loan
would be a High Cost Home Loan if its points and fees were $1800 or more; and a $18,000

Home Loan would be a High Cost Home Loan if its points and fees were $1000 (that is, the
lesser of $1000 or 6% of the loan amount).
164. Id. § 46:10B-24 ("conventional prepayment penalty").
[A "conventional prepayment penalty" is] any prepayment penalty or fee that may be
collected or charged in a home loan, and that is authorized by law other than by this
act, provided the home loan (1) does not have an annual percentage rate that exceeds
the conventional mortgage rate by more than two percentage points; and (2) does not
permit any prepayment fees or penalties that exceed two percent of the amount
prepaid.
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3. Calculation of the Total Points and Fees Threshold
The Federal TILA specifically mandates the disclosure of a loan's
APR - a standardized form of interest rate calculation - to encourage loan
price transparency and thereby provides consumers with a clearer
understanding of the cost of a loan. 16 5 The imposition of high points and
fees, which appear almost invariably with subprime and all predatory loans,
are far more confusing. Indeed, one of the persistent abuses in the home loan
market has been lenders' efforts to add charges to a loan that federal law
does not include in the loan's APR. 166 HOEPA and now HOSA attempt to
set forth a comprehensive list of charges that must be included in calculating
a loan's points and fees, and therefore, possibly triggering classification as a
Covered Home Loan or a High Cost Home Loan. However, by including
several items in the catalogue of charges that are specifically excluded from
the HOEPA points and fees threshold calculation, HOSA will shift a greater
proportion of Home Loans into its heavily regulated categories. While
HOSA's exclusion of up to two Bona Fide Discount Points from the points
and fees calculation appears to provide additional flexibility for Creditors,
the provision will not significantly affect the classification of High Cost
16 7
Home Loans for reasons discussed below.
a. Calculation of Points and Fees
Under the Act, the following charges must be included in calculating a
loan's total points and fees threshold: (1) all items, other than interest and a
time price differential, listed in § 1605(a)(1)-(4) of TILA,which includes all
points, origination fees, service charges and other charges by the lender such
as a loan fee, finder's fee or investigation or credit report fee; 16 8 (2) all
15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (TILA's purpose is to "assure a meaningful disclosure of
165.
credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms
available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit"); see also Rossman v. Fleet Bank
(R.I.) Nat'l Ass'n, 280 F.3d 384, 389 (3d Cir. 2002); Schnall v. Amboy Nat'l Bank, 279 F.3d
205, 219 (3d Cir. 2002); TRuTH IN LENDING, supra note 79, at 31 (TILA is "Congress's effort
to guarantee the accurate and meaningful disclosure of the costs of consumer credit and
thereby to enable consumers to make informed choices in the credit marketplace").
166. NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., TRUTH IN LENDING 209 (4th ed. Supp. 2002).
167. See infra text accompanying note 185.
168. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-24(3)(1) (West 2003). Section 1605(a) of TILA lists
items that must be included in HOEPA's points and fees calculation. 15 U.S.C. § 1605(a).
HOSA incorporates into its definition of points and fees, the following items (excluding
interest and the time price differential): "any amount payable under a point, discount, or other
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closing-related costs specifically listed in § 1605(e) of TILA; 169 (3) "all
compensation paid directly or indirectly to a mortgage broker;"' 170 (4) "the
cost of all premiums financed by the creditor, directly or indirectly," for any

credit insurance; 171 (5) the maximum loan prepayment fees and penalties

that could be charged in connection with the loan and all prepayment fees or
penalties that are actually incurred by a borrower if the loan refinances a
previous loan held by the same Creditor or its affiliate. 172
For the purposes of the Act, the term "points and fees" does not include
the following: (1) title insurance premiums and fees; 173 (2) taxes, filing fees,
and recording and other charges paid to public officials for perfecting or
satisfying a security interest; (3) certain "reasonable" fees paid to persons

system or additional charges; service or carrying charge; loan fee, finders fee, or similar
charge; and fee for an investigation or credit report." Id. § 1605(a)(1).
169. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-24(3)(2) (West 2003). Under § 1605(e) of TILA, these
charges are actually excluded from HOEPA's points and fees calculation. Section 1605(e)
reads as follows:
The following items, when charged in connection with any extension of credit
secured by an interest in real property, shall not be included in the computation of the
finance charge with respect to that transaction:
(1) Fees or premiums for title examination, title insurance, or similar purposes.
(2) Fees for preparation of loan-related documents.
(3) Escrows for future payments of taxes and insurance.
(4) Fees for notarizing deeds and other documents.
(5) Appraisal fees, including fees related to any pest infestation or flood hazard
inspections conducted prior to closing.
(6) Credit reports.
15 U.S.C. § 1605(e).
HOSA treats the items listed in § 1605(e) in the opposite manner of TILA by including
them in its points and fees calculation. Section 1605(e), like § 1605(a) references "credit
reports," making HOSA redundant in this small way.
170. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-24(3)(3) (West 2003). This provision would force
Creditors to reflect as a real cost to borrowers the indirect compensation paid to brokers by
Creditors in the form of a yield spread premium. See HUD-Treasury Report, supra note 8; see
also 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa)(4)(B) (requiring that "all compensation paid to mortgage brokers"
be included in the total points and fees calculation).
171. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-24 (West 2003).
172. Id. § 46:lOB-24(5), (6). As discussed below, unlike other state predatory lending
legislation and HOEPA itself, HOSA does not place any express limitation on the imposition
of prepayment penalties on High Cost Home Loans. See infra Part III.B.4.
173. Id. § 46:10B-24 ("points and fees" (2)). As described below, this exclusion
appears to contradict the inclusion of title insurance premiums in the points and fees
calculation required elsewhere in the Act. Id.
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unaffiliated 1 7 4 with either the Creditor or the mortgage broker, 175 for tax
payment services, flood certification, pest, flood, appraisal and inspection
fees, attorney's or notary's fees, escrow charges, 17 6 and fire and flood
insurance premiums, provided that such premiums are purchased from an
entity that is not affiliated with the Creditor or certain disclosures are
made.

17 7

Notably, HOSA's definition of "points and fees" is, in certain contexts,
either moot, inconsistent or confusing. First, the Act's inclusion of financed
premium insurance is rendered moot by section 1OB-25(4)(a) of the Act,
which categorically prohibits the inclusion of financed premium insurance in
the first place in any Home Loan. 178 No Creditor will ever calculate the cost
of such insurance because no Creditor will be permitted to even charge for
such a product. Perhaps the New Jersey legislature meant to prohibit the
charging of only single premium credit insurance in connection with Home
Loans, while requiring the inclusion in the points and fees calculation, the
174. "Affiliate" is defined by the Act with reference to the definition set forth in 12
U.S.C. § 1841. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:1OB-24(3) (West 2003) ("affiliate"); see also 12 U.S.C.
§ 1841(k) (2000) (defining an affiliate as "any company that controls, is controlled by, or is
under common control with another company").
175. These exclusions from "points and fees" incorporate "the conditions" in 12
C.F.R. § 226.4(c)(7), which are actually listed in § 226.32(b)(1)(iii).
176. See infra text accompanying note 182 (regarding the Act's ambiguous treatment
of escrows).
177. These conditions relating to premiums have been incorporated from 12 C.F.R.
§ 226.4(d)(2). N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-24 (West 2003) ("points and fees"). Section
226.4(d)(2) states:
(i) insurance coverage may be obtained from a person of the consumer's choice, and
this fact is disclosed. (ii) If the coverage is obtained from or through the creditor, the
premium for the initial term of insurance coverage shall be disclosed. If the term of
insurance is less than the term of the transaction, the term of insurance shall also be
disclosed.
12 C.F.R. § 226.4(d)(2).
DOBI has taken the position that "mortgage insurance" and "private mortgage insurance"
premiums are not considered in calculating the "points and fees" trigger. BuLLETI No. 03-30,
supra note 133, at 8. This seems to be the correct reading of the Act for, among other reasons,
the Act's enumeration of "points and fees" does not include such premiums. See id. (outlining
this and other reasons why such premiums are not to be considered when calculating the
"points and fees" trigger).
178. Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:1OB-24(4) (West 2003) (requiring inclusion in
points and fees calculation "[t]he cost of all premiums financed by the creditor, directly or
indirectly for any credit life, credit disability, credit unemployment or credit property
insurance, or any life or health insurance"), with id. § 46:IOB-25(4)(a) (prohibiting charging
any such fees in connection with a Home Loan).
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broader category of all financed credit insurance. In any event, it appears
that the legislature may have relied too reflexively on the points and fees
calculations set forth in HOEPA, which require that charges for single
premium credit insurance be calculated as part of the HOEPA points and
fees trigger, 179 but which do not otherwise prohibit the imposition of such
insurance charges.
Second, in its incorporation by reference of portions of HOEPA, the Act
creates an apparent inconsistency as to whether title insurance fees are
included in the points and fees calculation. On the one hand, "points and
fees" include, by reference to § 1605(e)(1) of TILA,"[flees or premiums for
title examination, title insurance, or similar purposes."' 18 0 On the other hand,
the Act expressly excludes from the definition of "points and fees" any "title
insurance premiums and fees, charges and premiums paid to a person or
entity holding an individual or organization insurance producer license in the
line of title insurance or a title insurance company, as defined by" New
Jersey's title insurance licensing law. 18 1 Perhaps the best way to harmonize
this apparent inconsistency is to read the former provision in this portion of
the Act as broader than and inclusive of the latter; that is, the former
category covers title fees paid to all parties, while the latter category covers
title fees paid only to licensed title insurers. Thus, by subtracting the smaller
from the broader category, what remains and must be included in the
definition of "points and fees" is title fees paid to unlicensed title service
providers. For instance, traditional title insurance premiums, paid to a thirdparty provider, would be excluded from the definition, while any fees
collected by a Creditor in connection with title issues - such as some kind of
referral fee - would be included.
Finally, the Act creates some confusion about whether or in what form
escrow charges should be included in the calculation of points and fees. On
the one hand, the Act includes escrows for future payments of taxes and
insurance. On the other hand, the same subsection of the Act excludes bona
fide and reasonable escrow charges paid to a person other than a Creditor or
its affiliate or to the mortgage broker or its affiliate. Textually, these two
sections seem to mean that escrows for future payments of taxes and
insurance that are either paid to the Creditor, mortgage broker, or one of
their affiliates or that are neither bona fide nor reasonable, are included in
the definition of points and fees.
179.
180.
181.

See 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(b)(iv).
15 U.S.C. § 1605(e)(1) (2000).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-24 (West 2003) ("points and fees").
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Although this appears to be the most coherent reading of the text, it is
inconsistent with standard lending practices in the prime market in which the
retention of reasonable escrows is common. 182 It would seem more
consistent with the Act's purposes if only those escrow charges that were in
excess of reasonable escrowed taxes and fees and insurance premiums were
included within the definition of points and fees. Notwithstanding this, the
inclusion of a reasonable escrow should only make up a very small portion
of the points and fees calculation (because lenders often escrow only a few
months of payments at anyone time) and so, perhaps, its inclusion may have
been purposeful.
b. Exceptions for Bona Fide Discount Points
In the conventional loan market, lenders frequently charge points in
exchange for a lower loan interest rate than the borrower would otherwise
receive. Such discount points most benefit borrowers who can recoup their
initial point investment by paying the bargained-for lower interest rate over a
long period of time. The Act recognizes the value of such an exchange by
excluding from both the Covered Home Loan threshold and the High Cost
Home Loan points and fees threshold, up to two Bona Fide Discount Points.
According to the Act, in order for discount points to be "bona fide," they
must meet two criteria: (i) the interest rate on the loan that is being
discounted, prior to the application to the discount points, must be at most
two points above the conventional mortgage rate 1 83 for first lien mortgages
(and at most three-and-a-half points for junior lien mortgages); and (ii) they
must be knowingly paid by the borrower for the express purpose of, and in
fact, reducing the loan's interest rate, so that the borrower recovers an
amount equal to such discount points within the first five years of the
184
scheduled loan payments.
182. Indeed, the New Jersey Department of Banking has taken the position that such
escrows are not included within the ambit of "points and fees." BULLETIN No. 03-15, supra
note 125, at 7.
183. Generally considered the average national mortgage rate, it is specifically defined
by the Act as "the most recently published annual yield on conventional mortgages published
by" the Federal Reserve Board. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-24(3) (West 2003) ("conventional
mortgage rate"). For example, at around the time of the Act's passage, the conventional
mortgage rate was 4.93%. See supra text accompanying notes 157-60.
184. Id. § 46:IOB-24(4) ("bona fide discount points"). The Act considers discount
points to be recouped within the first five years if:
the reduction in the interest rate that is achieved by the payment of the loan discount
points reduces the interest charged on the scheduled payments such that the
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Because High Cost Home Loans frequently have interest rates that far
exceed two points above the conventional mortgage rate, the Bona Fide
Discount Point exclusion will have a relatively insubstantial effect on that
category of loans. The exclusion may apply to the rare case of a Home Loan
that is classified as high cost solely by virtue of its high points and fees
structure, but that otherwise has an interest rate that is within two points of
the conventional mortgage rate. 18 5 The Bona Fide Discount Point provision
will certainly have a greater impact on the Covered Home Loan category
because it will prevent some Home Loans from being classified as Covered
Home Loans.
B. The ProhibitionsUnder the Act
As described above, the Act provides for the greatest amount of
regulation for High Cost Home Loans based upon the valid assumption that
those loans are the most likely to involve predatory practices. The Act also
prohibits loan flipping for Covered Home Loans (and the included category
of High Cost Home Loans) and certain additional practice for all Home
Loans, which are considered economically unjustifiable.
1. High Cost Home Loans
While loan terms that are prohibited by the Act may have legitimate
economic justification when employed in commercial or prime residential
credit markets, the legislature appears to have taken the position that such
terms are overwhelmingly predatory in the High Cost Home Loan market.
The legislature has also seen fit to add additional disclosure responsibilities
in this arena.
a. Balloon Payments
The Act prohibits balloon payments in connection with High Cost Home
Loans. Typically, a balloon payment appears as a very large lump-sum
payment that is due at the end of the term of a loan that has a schedule of
borrower's dollar amount of savings in interest over the first five years is equal to or
exceeds the dollar amount of loan discount points paid by the borrower.
Id.
Note, however, that this does not necessarily amount to an actual savings by the borrower
because it fails to account for the time value of money.
185. It will certainly not be surprising, however, to see the subprime market develop
low-interest, high-fee mortgage products as they adapt to the requirements of the Act.
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periodic payments. 18 6 The Act defines a balloon payment more expansively
as any "scheduled payment that is more than twice as large as the average of
earlier scheduled payments." 187 Lenders claim balloon payments allow
borrowers to obtain loans at lower monthly costs in anticipation of increased
income or future refinancing at lower rates. 18 8 If the income increase does
not occur and/or interest rates do not drop, however, the borrower owes an
enormous final payment that she often cannot pay. In any event, the
legislature seems to have concluded that most balloon payments for
subprime borrowers are predatory because it would be unlikely that such a
borrower could make the balloon payment and may thereby be forced to
refinance with the same Creditor on disadvantageous terms.
b. Negative Amortization
The Act prohibits High Cost Home Loans in which "the outstanding
principal balance will increase at any time over the course of the loan
because the regular periodic payments do not cover the full amount of
interest due." 18 9 Such a prohibition obviously bars those loans that are
intended from the outset to be negative amortization loans. But it also bars
adjustable rate loans with capped monthly payments, even where rising
interest rates would require higher monthly payments to ensure that the
principal balance of the loan did not increase over time. As with balloon
loans, lenders claim that negative amortization loans allow borrowers to
obtain loans at lower monthly costs in anticipation of increased income or
future refinancing at lower rates. 19 0 Again, the legislature seems to have
taken the position that virtually all negative amortization loans are predatory
in the High Cost Home Loan arena.

186. See supra Part II.C.6.
187. § 46:10B-26(a). This provision does not apply "when the payment schedule is
adjusted to the seasonal or irregular income of the borrower." Id.
188.
See FANNIE MAE, TAKING THE MYSTERY OUT OF YOUR MORTGAGE: WHAT
DESKTOP UNDERWRITER ANALYZES INYOUR LOAN APPLICATION 25 (2003).

189.

§ 46:1OB-26(b).

190.

FAIR Hous. ADMIN., FHA INSURED LOANS: CALCULATING GRADUATED PAYMENT

MORTGAGES, available at
updated Nov. 27, 2001).

http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/sfh/gpm/gpmcalc.cfm

(last
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c. Default Interest Rates

The Act bars the inclusion of provisions in High Cost Home Loans that
allow the Creditor to increase the interest rate on the loan after a borrower's
default. 19 1 Lenders argue that such default interest rates encourage timely
payment as the threat of higher interest rates will encourage borrowers to
make their payments. The legislature appears to have agreed with consumer
advocates who have argued that such provisions make it difficult to cure a
default once it has occurred and thus unnecessarily increase the risk of
192
default and, ultimately, foreclosure.
d. Prepaid Finance Charges
Prepaid finance charges generally refer to "any finance charge paid
separately in cash or by check before or at consummation of a transaction, or
withheld from the proceeds of the credit at any time." 19 3 Prepayment
provisions in the prime market are commonly employed to collect the
interest due for the days from closing to the first scheduled monthly
payment, which typically would not exceed the first 30 days' interest due on
the loan. 19 4 The Act limits prepaid interest provisions in High Cost Home
Loans by prohibiting Creditors from retaining at closing any more than two
periodic payments - for example, two months' payments on a loan that is
repaid on a monthly basis - from the borrower's loan proceeds. 19 5
e. Access to Legal Remedies
The Act voids any provision in a High Cost Home Loan that either: (i)
allows a party (such as the Creditor) to "require a borrower to assert any
claim or defense in a forum that is less convenient, more costly, or more
dilatory for the resolution of a dispute" than the New Jersey courts or (ii)
"limits in any way any claim or defense the borrower may have." 19 6
191.
§ 46:10B-26(c). This provision does not "apply to interest rate changes in a
variable rate loan otherwise consistent with the provisions of the loan documents, provided
the change in the interest rate is not triggered by the event of default or the acceleration of the
indebtedness." Id.
192. See NAT'L CoNsuMER LAw CR., supra note 166, § 10.4.3.
193. 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(23) (2003).
194.

MORTGAGE CALCULATOR FIN. CTR., MORTGAGE TERMS DICTIONARY, availableat

http://mortgage-calculators.orgldictionary/dictionary.php3?lit=p (last visited Jan. 16, 2004).
195.
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-26(d) (West 2003).
196. Id. § 46:10B-26(e).
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Moreover, a Creditor making a High Cost Home Loan must use New Jersey
97
foreclosure procedures. 1
f. Mandatory Notice to Borrower
In addition to restrictions on Creditor activities, the Act attempts to
increase consumer understanding of the lending process. The Act requires
that Creditors making High Cost Home Loans provide a notice to the
borrower, at least three days prior to the loan closing, 198 which, among other
things, encourages the borrower to consult an attorney and "shop around"
for the best deal on her loan. 19 9 In addition, the notice must warn the

197. Id. § 46: 10B-26(k). It is unclear whether the legislative intent of this section is to
bar mandatory arbitration clauses. Other state predatory lending legislation does bar such
clauses, see, e.g., N.C. GN STAT. § 24-1.1(e) (2003), but it is not clear whether arbitration
would be considered "less convenient, more costly, or more dilatory" than the civil court
syster. § 46: 1OB-26(e).
198. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-26(f) (West 2003). The Act incorporates the disclosure
timing requirements of HOEPA contained in 12 C.F.R. § 226.31(c).
199. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:1OB-26(f) (West 2003). The Act requires that the text of the
notice be substantially in the following form:
NOTICE TO BORROWER
YOU SHOULD BE AWARE THAT YOU MIGHT BE ABLE TO OBTAIN A
LOAN AT A LOWER COST. YOU SHOULD SHOP AROUND AND COMPARE
LOAN RATES AND FEES. MORTGAGE LOAN RATES AND CLOSING COSTS
AND FEES VARY BASED ON MANY FACTORS, INCLUDING YOUR
PARTICULAR CREDIT AND FINANCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES,
YOUR
EMPLOYMENT HISTORY, THE LOAN-TO-VALUE REQUESTED AND THE
TYPE OF PROPERTY THAT WILL SECURE YOUR LOAN. THE LOAN RATE
AND FEES COULD ALSO VARY BASED ON WHICH CREDITOR OR BROKER
YOU SELECT.
IF YOU ACCEPT THE TERMS OF THIS LOAN, THE CREDITOR WILL
HAVE A MORTGAGE LIEN ON YOUR HOME. YOU COULD LOSE YOUR
HOME AND ANY MONEY YOU PUT INTO IT IF YOU DO NOT MEET YOUR
PAYMENT OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE LOAN.
YOU SHOULD CONSULT AN ATTORNEY-AT-LAW AND A QUALIFIED
INDEPENDENT
CREDIT COUNSELOR
OR OTHER EXPERIENCED
FINANCIAL ADVISOR REGARDING THE RATE, FEES AND PROVISIONS OF
THIS MORTGAGE LOAN BEFORE YOU PROCEED. A LIST OF QUALIFIED
COUNSELORS IS AVAILABLE BY CONTACTING THE NEW JERSEY
DEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND INSURANCE.
YOU ARE NOT REQUIRED TO COMPLETE THIS LOAN AGREEMENT
MERELY BECAUSE YOU HAVE RECEIVED THIS DISCLOSURE OR HAVE
SIGNED A LOAN APPLICATION.
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borrower that (i) by accepting the loan, the Creditor will have a mortgage on
her home and (ii) failure to make timely payments can lead to the loss of the
borrower's home. 2 00 HOSA's required disclosures are an important
supplement to current federal home mortgagor protections because the
disclosures are more comprehensible and comprehensive than those required
by TILA and they are coupled, unlike in TILA, with actual prohibitions on
predatory behavior.
g. Mandatory Loan Counseling
Recognizing that many High Cost Home Loan borrowers are financially
unsophisticated and unfamiliar with fundamental aspects of the consumer
credit market, the Act attempts to channel prospective High Cost Home
Loan borrowers who finance points and fees 2 0 1 to independent non-profit
loan counselors. 2 02 Prior to consummating such a High Cost Home Loan,
the Creditor must obtain a certification that the borrower has received such
counseling as to the advisability of the transaction. 20 3 New Jersey currently
has a number of established not-for-profits, such as Citizen Action, which
2 04
provide such loan counseling.
By limiting required loan counseling to those whose High Cost Home
Loans have financed points and fees - not simply a very high APR - the
legislature appears to offer the benefits of counseling only to those
borrowers whose loans contain costs that are less transparent to borrowers.
Other High Cost Home Loan borrowers, however, would appear to also
REMEMBER, PROPERTY TAXES AND HOMEOWNER'S INSURANCE
ARE YOUR RESPONSIBILITY. NOT ALL CREDITORS PROVIDE ESCROW
SERVICES FOR THESE PAYMENTS. YOU SHOULD ASK YOUR CREDITOR
ABOUT THESE SERVICES.
ALSO, YOUR PAYMENTS ON EXISTING DEBTS CONTRIBUTE TO YOUR
CREDIT RATINGS. YOU SHOULD NOT ACCEPT ANY ADVICE TO IGNORE
YOUR REGULAR PAYMENTS TO YOUR EXISTING CREDITORS.
Id.
200. Id.
201. Note that a High Cost Home Loan can finance at most two points. § 46:10B26(/).
202. § 46: 1OB-26(g). Such counseling must be given by a "third-party nonprofit credit
counselor, approved by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development
and the Department of Banking and Insurance" regarding the "advisability of the loan
transaction." Id.
203. Id.
204. See, e.g., N.J. CmzEN
AcTioN, WELCOME TO N.J.C.A., available at
http:lwww.njcitizenaction.org/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2004).
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benefit from loan counseling, such as borrowers who are eligible for prime
loans but who are about to enter into a High Cost Home Loan due to a lack
of information about the consumer credit market.
h. Direct Payment to Home Improvement Contractors
Home improvement contractors frequently help generate predatory
loans. In many cases, an unscrupulous contractor will arrange financing for a
home improvement loan with a pre-selected predatory lender, so as to be
paid directly by the complicit lender at loan closing before the work is
complete or capably done. 20 5 Such a direct payment arrangement deprives a
borrower of any leverage to control the quality or timeliness of a
contractor's work. In response to this prevalent practice, the Act prohibits
any of the proceeds from a High Cost Home Loan from being paid directly
206
to a home improvement contractor.
i. Loan Modification and Deferral Fees
The Act bars a Creditor from charging a borrower any fees to modify,
renew, extend, or amend a High Cost Home Loan or to defer any payment
due under the terms of a High Cost Home Loan. 2 0 7 This provision, while
facially similar to provisions limiting the costs of refinancing, appears to
address changes to the non-monetary terms of a loan as well as unplanned
contingencies that affect a borrower's ability to make scheduled loan
payments. 20 8 For instance, if a Creditor and borrower agree to any change in
the terms of the High Cost Home Loan - as where a borrower wants to defer
a few monthly payments during a period of unemployment - the Creditor

205. See supra text accompanying notes 84-85.
206. § 46: 1OB-26(h). The proceeds of a home-improvement loan must be payable: (i)
to the borrower, (ii) jointly to the borrower and the contractor, or (iii) at the election of the
borrower, to a third-party escrow agent in accordance with a written agreement signed by the
borrower, Creditor and contractor prior to disbursement. Id.
207. Id. § 46: 1OB-26(i).
208. Renewing a loan is borrowing a similar amount under the same terms as the
previous loan after its payment term has expired. Refinancing is "[playing off an existing loan
with the proceeds from a new loan, usually of the same size, and using the same property as
collateral." INVESTORWORDS.COM, REFINANCING, availableat http://www.investorwords.con/
4115/refinancing.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2004). Typically, borrowers refinance when they
want "to reduce monthly payments or to modify interest charges." Id.
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simply cannot charge any fees. 2 0 9 It is unclear why the legislature chose to
categorically prohibit charges for such modifications - which would appear
to dramatically reduce Creditor incentive to agree to loan modifications when some could be useful to a borrower if made available on reasonable
2 10
terms.
j. Same-Creditor Refinancings
The Act prohibits any Creditor from flipping Covered Home Loans
(which include all High Cost Home Loans) extended by that or any other
Creditor in certain circumstances. 2 1 1 In addition, section 5(j) of the Act bars
a Creditor from charging points and fees for a new High Cost Home Loan
that refinances an existing High Cost Home Loan already owned by that
same Creditor. 2 12 This additional prohibition seems to acknowledge that a
Creditor refinancing a loan that it already owns faces lower underwriting
costs than a new Creditor because it already has at least some underwriting
2 13
data on and a payment history with that borrower.
k. Limited Financings of Points and Fees
The Act provides that under no circumstances may a Creditor finance,
directly or indirectly, points and fees for a High Cost Home Loan that are in
excess of 2% of the total loan amount.2 14 This provision, of course, does not
bar the charging of more than two points if paid in cash, but recognizes that
the financing of points and fees represents a hidden cost to many subprime
borrowers and frequently has the effect of stripping equity from their
homes. 2 15 This two point cap does allow cash-poor borrowers (e.g., those
209. This prohibition does not prevent the Creditor from capitalizing deferred interest.
Thus, if a borrower missed a payment, the Creditor could add the missed interest to the
principal balance due on the loan.
210. Cf. § 46:101B-26(/) (limiting refinancing points and fees for High Cost Home
Loans to 2%).
211. See infra Part III.B.2.
212. § 46:10B-26(j).
213. Where the originating Creditor still holds the note, this assumption would seem to
be particularly valid as it could rely in part on its initial underwriting analysis. This
assumption might be weaker where the borrower seeks the refinancing from a Creditor who
purchased the loan on the secondary market. Nonetheless, this provision applies to the
secondary market purchaser as much as it does to the originator.
214. § 46:10B-26(/).
215. See supra text accompanying notes 45-46.
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who do not have the cash to pay points and fees up front) to access the
equity in their homes, but limits those point and fees to an amount that is
more in line with those found in the prime market than with those in the high
2 16
end of the subprime market.
2. Covered Home Loans
As described, the Act's intermediate classification of loans, Covered
Home Loans, has a lower points and fees trigger than the High Cost Home
Loan classification and includes a greater number of Home Loans within its
regulatory scope. 2 17 Covered Home Loans (which include all High Cost
Home Loans) have only one prohibition in addition to those that apply to all
2 18
Home Loans. This prohibition relates to the practice of "flipping" loans.
Flipping refers to creditors' attempts to repeatedly refinance loans, primarily
as a way of extracting prepayment penalties, points and other costs. 2 19 By
prohibiting flipping in connection with Covered Home Loans, the legislature
appears to have concluded that flipping is a particularly abusive practice that
inequitably strips equity from borrowers throughout a greater portion of the
subprime market than just the High Cost Home Loan portion.
According to the Act, flipping occurs when: (i) a Creditor makes a
Covered Home Loan to a borrower; (ii) that refinances any existing Home
Loan 22 0 that was consummated within the prior 60 months; and (iii) that
new loan does not have a "reasonable, tangible net benefit to the
borrower." 2 2 1 The only elaboration offered by the Act to assess whether a
loan provides such a benefit is to consider "all the circumstances, including
the terms of both the new and refinanced loans, the economic and
noneconomic circumstances." 22 2 In response to industry concerns about the
ambiguity of the "reasonable tangible net benefit" standard, DOBI issued

216. See supra note 58 (noting that when they are charged, points and fees for prime
market loans average 1.1%).
217. See supra text accompanying notes 146-64.
218. § 46:10B-25(b).
219. See supra Part II.C.5.
220. The Act specifically addresses whether a loan that was closed prior to the Act's
effective date of November 27, 2003 is deemed to be an existing home loan for the purposes
of the Act's flipping provisions. § 46:1OB-35(15). The Act deems such a loan an "existing
home loan" so long as it meets the Act's definition of a Home Loan. Id.; see BuLEN No.
03-30, supra note 133, at 4.
221. § 46:10B-25(b).
222. Id.
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guidelines to assist Creditors and, presumably, courts interpreting the
2 23

Act.

In addition, the Act specifies two additional circumstances in which any
"home loan refinancing" is presumed to constitute illegal flipping: (1) where
the primary tangible benefit to the borrower is a lower interest rate on the
"new loan" and where it will take more than four years for the borrower to
recoup her closing costs through the interest rate savings and (2) where the
borrower will lose the benefits of a mortgage originated, subsidized or
guaranteed by or through a state, tribal or local government, or nonprofit
organization and where that mortgage had either (i) a below-market interest
rate at the time of origination; or (ii) beneficial non-standard payment terms
such as payments that vary with income or are limited to a percentage of
22 4
income or where no payments are required in certain circumstances.
The language governing these two per se categories of flipping is not as
precise as it should be. The text of these subsections refers to a "home loan
refinancing" and a "new loan" rather than specifying that the refinancing or
new loan at issue be a Covered Home Loan. 22 5 This plain, broad reading of
the Act would not be controversial except that DOBI has taken the position
223. According to DOBI, "lenders should look at a range of factors related to an
individual borrower's circumstances." BULLETN No. 03-15, supra note 125, at 10. DOBI
provides the following examples of factors that could be relevant to the reasonable, tangible
net benefit assessment:
Terms of the new and old loan, including, but not limited to, note rate, amortization
schedule, and balloon payment provisions, provided that costs associated with (and
paid at or before closing of) the old loan, such as closing costs or points and fees
other than prepayment penalties, are not normally relevant to the determination of
flipping;
Costs of the new loan, including points and fees charged on the new loan as well as
other closing costs associated with the transaction as routinely disclosed on the
closing statement;
Loan-to-value ratio of the new loan compared to that associated with the outstanding
balance on the existing home loan;
Debt-to-income ratio of the borrower before and after the proposed transaction;
In cases where economic benefits do not demonstrably indicate that a reasonable,
tangible net benefit has occurred, a significant reason that explains the need for, and
proposed use of, the loan proceeds; and
Other benefits the borrower receives from the transaction.
Id.
In addition, DOBI recommends that the Creditor "obtain an explanation from the
borrower regarding any non-economic benefits the borrower associates with the loan
transaction." Id.
224. § 46:10B-25(b)(l)-(2).
225. Id.
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22 6
that the Act applies only where the new loan is a Covered Home Loan.
Because the general prohibition on flipping applies specifically to Covered
Home Loans and because these per se prohibitions are, structurally, included
as subsets of the Covered Home Loan flipping prohibitions, the most
reasonable reading would conclude that these per se flipping provisions, like
the general flipping prohibition, apply only to the category of Covered Home
Loans. 2 2 7 Under this holistic reading, the anti-flipping prohibitions would
not apply to all Home Loans.
228
3. All Home Loans

The following are practices that are prohibited for all Home Loans including Covered Home Loans and High Cost Home Loans.
a. Credit Insurance
HOSA prohibits Creditors from financing any credit insurance along
with Home Loans. 2 29 For the reasons already described, the packing of
financed credit insurance premiums has become a huge financial boon to
certain lenders without providing any reasonable benefit to - and, indeed,
stripping substantial equity from - the borrowers who are frequently
deceived into accepting such insurance. 2 30 The legislature apparently
regarded the practice of financing credit insurance as so valueless that it
chose to prohibit it for all Home Loans. Borrowers can still elect credit
insurance in which premiums are paid on a monthly installment basis, as
23 1
long as those premiums are not financed as part of the loan.
b. Encouraging Default
The Act prohibits Creditors from encouraging a borrower to default on
existing debt through the refinancing of a Home Loan. 2 32 When a
226. BuLLETiNNo. 03-15, supra note 125, at 10.
227. Id. at 9; BuuETN No. 03-30, supra note 133, at 3-4.
228. This includes, as mentioned above, all Covered Home Loans and High Cost
Home Loans.
229. § 46:10B-25(a). As previously described, this provision of the Act renders moot
section 24(3), requiring the inclusion of the cost of financed credit insurance as part of the
points and fees calculation. See supra Part III.A.3.a.
230. See supra text accompanying notes 67-70.
231. § 46:10B-25(a).
232. Id. § 46: 1OB-25(c).
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prospective Creditor encourages default, it unnecessarily puts the borrower
at risk of foreclosure and destroys her credit rating. This, in turn, can easily
make the borrower overly dependent upon the Creditor, even if the new
terms being offered are severely disadvantageous given the borrower's credit
profile. The legislature recognized that this practice is so universally
coercive and without legitimate economic benefits that it banned the practice
for all Home Loans.
c. Late Payment Fees
The Act also regulates late payment fees that Creditors can charge in
relation to all Home Loans in the following ways: (i) no late payment fee
may be in excess of 5% of the amount of the payment past due; 2 33 (ii) late
fee payments may only be assessed for a payment past due for 15 days or
more; 2 3 4 (iii) late fee payments cannot be charged more than once for the
same late payment; 23 5 (iv) no late fee payment may be imposed unless the
Creditor notifies the borrower within 45 days following the date the payment
was due that a late payment fee had been imposed for a particular late
payment; 2 36 and (v) the Creditor shall treat each and every payment as
233. Id. § 46:10B-25(d)(1).
234. Id. § 46:10B-25(d)(2).
235. Id. § 46:10B-25(d)(3).
If a late payment fee is deducted from a payment made on the loan, and such
deduction causes a subsequent default on a subsequent payment, no late payment fee
may be imposed for such default. If a late payment fee has been once imposed with
respect to a particular late payment, no such fee shall be imposed with respect to any
future payment that would have been timely and sufficient, but for the previous
default.
Id.
For example, a borrower owes a $1000 monthly payment to a Creditor due on the first of
each month. In April, the borrower pays $1000 on April 20 and misses the assigned due date
by more than 15 days. The Creditor assesses a $50 late payment fee for April. In May, the
borrower pays $1000 on May 1. The Creditor cannot take $50 from the May payment, apply it
to April's late fee, and assess another late payment fee of $50 because the borrower paid only
$950 toward May's balance. Instead, and in effect, the borrower cannot pay off the entire loan
until that $50 is also paid off, but otherwise the failure to pay the late payment fee will have
no effect on the borrower.
236. Id. § 46: 10B-25(d)(4). "No late payment fee may be collected from any borrower
if the borrower informs the Creditor that nonpayment of an installment is in dispute and
presents proof of payment within 45 days of receipt of the Creditor's notice of the late fee."
Id. Practically, this provision contemplates that the "proof of payment" establish that the
payment was in fact timely, although it does not expressly so provide.

RUTGERS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 35:645

posted on the same date as it was received by the Creditor, servicer,
Creditor's agent, or at the address provided to the borrower for making
237
payments.
d. Discretionary Loan Acceleration
Acceleration provisions are common in loan documents in order to allow
a Creditor to demand payment of the total outstanding balance or demand
additional collateral before the end of the term of the loan upon material
default by the borrower. HOSA bans the commercially unreasonable practice
of accelerating a loan at the Creditor's sole discretion. 2 38 The Act plainly
recognizes that a borrower should be able to rely upon a contractual payment
schedule and not be subject to foreclosure upon a Creditor's whim.
e. Payoff Letter
Where a borrower seeks information on a loan's remaining payoff
balance, the Creditor must provide it within seven business days of the
borrower's request free of charge. 2 39 This limits the excessive fees that
some lenders have taken to charging for a simple and low-cost request.
4. What HOSA Fails to Regulate
HOSA is also notable for its failure to directly regulate two very
common features of predatory loans. First, HOSA does not address the
predatory practice of asset-based lending; it does not require, in any direct
way, that Creditors consider a borrower's ability to repay a High Cost Home

237. Id. § 46:1OB-25(d)(5). It appears that the Creditor must post a payment as
received even if it is sent to any address of the Creditor, servicer or the Creditor's agent other
than the one indicated for the making of payments. This seems odd in that it allows the
Creditor to effectively delay payment. DOBI has taken the position that for depository
institutions, the word "date" shall mean "banking day," which would typically mean by the
end of the early afternoon on any given weekday. ButuEniN No. 03-30, supra note 133, at 6-7.
For other financial service providers, DOBI will construe "date" to mean "any day that the
provider is open for business provided that the payment is received before the close of
business hours." Id. at 7.
238. § 46:1OB-25(4)(e). "This provision does not prohibit acceleration of the loan in
good faith due to the borrower's failure to abide by the material terms of the loan." Id.
239. Id. § 46:1OB-25(f).
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Loan. 2 40

HOEPA currently prohibits lenders from extending credit without
regard to a borrower's ability to repay, 24 1 but only in cases where the lender
engages in a "pattern or practice" of such activity. 24 2 The Consumer Fraud
Act's prohibition on unconscionable commercial conduct could arguably
reach certain instances of asset-based lending; however, a requirement that a
Creditor consider a borrower's ability to repay based on her income rather
than the equity in her home, akin to provisions of a number of other state
statutes addressing predatory lending, 24 3 would have been an important
supplement to HOEPA's limited protections for New Jersey Home Loan
borrowers.
Second, the Act does not directly regulate the common predatory
practice of levying prepayment penalties on High Cost Home Loans. 24 4
Virtually all of the states' statutes that have chosen to aggressively respond
to the problem of predatory lending have either banned or substantially
limited prepayment penalties that can be charged with high cost loans. 24 5
240. See supra text accompanying notes 54-57 (describing lending without ability to
repay as a central component of many predatory loans).
241. HOEPA defines this conduct as extending credit "based on the consumers'
collateral without regard to the consumers' repayment ability, including the consumers'
current and expected income, current obligations, and employment." 15 U.S.C. § 1639(h)
(2000).
242. Traditionally, the "pattern or practice" element of the prohibition has been a hard
one for plaintiffs to satisfy, requiring proof of several instances of prohibited conduct in a
short period of time. Newton v. United Cos. Fin. Corp., 24 F. Supp. 2d 444, 457 (E.D. Pa.
1998). The recent amendments have loosened the requirement somewhat, creating a
presumptive violation where the lender has failed to document and verify the borrower's
ability to pay. Truth in Lending, 66 Fed. Reg. 65,604, 65,606 (Dec. 20, 2001) (to be codified
at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226). The amended rule seeks to strengthen HOEPA's prohibition on making
loans based on homeowners' equity without regard to repayment ability. Id. It "creates a
presumption that a creditor has violated the statutory prohibition on engaging in a pattern or
practice of making HOEPA loans without regard to repayment ability if the creditor generally
does not verify and document consumers' repayment ability." Id.
243. See, e.g., 2003 ARK. ACTS 2598(k)(1) (requiring lenders to evaluate borrower's
ability to repay but setting no percentage of debt-to-income ratio that would presumptively
establish such ability); CAL. FIN. CODE § 4931(f)(1) (West 2003) (same prohibition but setting
ratio at 55%); MAss. REGS CODE tit. 209, § 32.00 (5)(a) (2003) (requiring lenders to evaluate
certain lower-income borrowers' ability to repay and setting ratio at 50%); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§24-1.1E (7)(c)(2) (2003) (prohibiting lending without considering borrower's ability to
repay, but presuming such ability exists if monthly debt-to-income ratio is 50% or lower).
244. See supra text accompanying notes 61-65 (discussing ways in which prepayment
penalties can be abusive when made in connection with high cost loans).
245. See, e.g., 2003 ARK. ACTS (3)(m) (prohibiting financing of prepayment fees or
penalties); CAL. FIN. CODE § 4970(a)(1) (West 2003) (limiting or barring prepayment fees
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HOEPA also bans the practice under certain circumstances. 2 46 The absence
of a direct prohibition on prepayment penalties in HOSA can be attributed to
the existence of another pre-existing New Jersey statute that entitles a
borrower to prepay a mortgage loan without penalty. 2 47 In addition, HOSA
does indirectly regulate prepayment penalties by forbidding Creditors from
financing fees when refinancing a High Cost Home Loan already held by
24 8
that Creditor.
C. Liability Under the Act
The liability provisions of the Act are somewhat complex but allow for
substantial damages against Creditors who violate them. Notably, New
Jersey is now one of only a handful of states that has extended liability
broadly to assignees of certain home loans. 24 9 Indeed, the scope of the Act's
assignee liability provisions is broad enough to alter the dynamic of
secondary market financing of High Cost Home Loans. As a result, the Act's
assignee liability provisions are likely to dry up much of the funding for
predatory loans in New Jersey.
1. Creditor Liability
Section 8 of the Act provides for both damages and equitable relief
against Creditors who violate the Act's provisions. First, a violation of the
depending on proximity to closing date); GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-5 (1)(A), (B) (2003)
(limiting or barring prepayment fees depending on proximity to closing date); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 24-L.lE (c)(3)(a) (2003) (prohibiting all prepayment penalties).
246. Specifically, HOEPA prohibits the imposition of prepayment penalties unless the
creditor can demonstrate that: (1) the loan will not cause the borrower to pay more than 50%
of gross monthly income toward "monthly indebtedness payments"; (2) the borrower's
income and expense are verified by a financial statement signed by the borrower and by a
credit report; (3) the creditor is not refinancing either its own or an affiliate's loan; (4) it is
imposed only during the first five years of the mortgage; and (5) the prepayment penalty is
otherwise legal under state law. See 15 U.S.C. § 1639(c)(2)(A)-(D) (2000).
247. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46: 1OB-2 (West 2003) ("Prepayment of a mortgage loan may
be made by or on behalf of a mortgagor at any time without penalty."). However, in Shinn v.
Encore Mortgage Services, Inc., 96 F. Supp. 2d 419, 422 (D.N.J. 2000), a court held that this
statutory bar on prepayment penalties was preempted as to "alternative mortgage
transactions," such as adjustable rate mortgages, by the federal Alternative Mortgage
Transactions Parity Act of 1982, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3801-06 (2000). d. at 423.
248. See supra note 67.
249. See, e.g., 2003 N.M. Laws 436; N.Y. BANKING LAW § 6(f) (McKinney Supp.
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Act is deemed a per se violation of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act. 2 50
Accordingly, a borrower may elect to seek damages under either (i) the
Consumer Fraud Act, which mandates treble damages - itself a strong
remedy - and attorneys fees, 2 5 1 or (ii) HOSA, which provides for statutory
damages for material violations equal to all finance charges agreed to in the
home loan agreement, plus up to 10% of the amount financed. 25 2 In addition
to this election, a borrower may be entitled to recover punitive damages for
egregious violations, costs and reasonable attorney's fees. 2 5 3 The structure
of this damages election, which requires borrowers to choose between the
Consumer Fraud Act's treble damages provision or the Act's statutory
damages and potential punitive damages, gives HOSA one of the strongest
consumer protection remedies in New Jersey.
Second, the Act authorizes broad equitable relief.2 5 4 Thus, borrowers
may, in addition to seeking damages, assert violations of the Act as a
defense to a Creditor's foreclosure action. Where Creditors commit material
violations, borrowers may thereby be entitled to extinguish their entire
obligation under the predatory loan. 25 5

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-29(a) (West 2003).
251. Id. § 56:8-19.
(In a Consumer Fraud Act action,] the court shall, in addition to any other
appropriate legal or equitable relief, award threefold the damages sustained by any
person in interest. In all actions under this section, including those brought by the
Attorney General, the court shall also award reasonable attorneys' fees, filing fees
and reasonable costs of suit.
250.

Id.

252. Id. § 46:1OB-29(a), (b)(1).
253. Id. § 46:10B-29(b)(1)(b)-(c). Importantly, the Act expressly states that its penalty
provisions are cumulative, not exclusive of, other remedies a borrower may have. Id.
§ 46: 1OB-30. Borrowers may therefore still assert causes of action under TILA; HOEPA; the
Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617 (2000); common law fraud;
unconscionability doctrines and the like.
254. § 46:10B-29(b)(2).
255. See id. The Act also contains a catch-all and somewhat ambiguous provision that
makes it a violation of the Act to circumvent in bad faith the application of the Act by either
(i) dividing a loan transaction into separate parts or (ii) using any other subterfuge with the
intent to evade the Act. Id. § 46: 1OB-27(c). The catch-all provision may reflect a legislative
concern about not anticipating all potentially unscrupulous lending practices as they may
appear in the future. Cf Eric Posner & Richard Haynes, The Law and Economics of
Consumer Finance, 4 AM. LAw & ECON. Rnv. 162 (2003) (arguing that much consumer
protection legislation is rendered ineffective by their targets' ability to circumvent black letter
prohibitions). The provision appears intended to prevent the secondary market from
structuring residential mortgage backed securities pools to separate the flow of income from
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The time in which such claims can be brought against Creditors is
perplexing at first read in large part because the Act fails to specify a statute
of limitations period except in certain narrow instances. In general, however,
causes of action under the Act have a six-year statute of limitations;
however, the Act provides for a virtually unlimited statute of limitations
period for borrowers asserting claims or defenses in response to foreclosure,
collection or debt acceleration actions brought by Covered Home Loan or
2 56
High Cost Home Loan Creditors.
The general Creditor liability provisions contained in section 8 appear to
be limited by two provisions of the Act that impose caps on damages and
which are placed in unrelated sections of the Act. First, section 6 of the Act,
which predominantly deals with assignee liability considerations, imposes a
cap on the general Creditor damages election, by limiting damages to: (i) the
amount already paid on the loan; (ii) remaining liability; plus (iii) costs and
attorney's fees, for actions against manufactured home loan and home
improvement loan Creditors who have worked in tandem on the borrower's
loan with the seller of the manufactured home or home improvements (Sales
and Services Creditors). 2 57 Perhaps the best way of understanding this
apparent limitation on the general liability provision, is to construe the
section 6(a) provision as a cap on damages only as against the narrow
category of Sales and Services Creditors. Borrowers would be entitled to
pursue the broader, general election of damages under section 8 against all
25 8
other Creditors.
Second, section 6(c) of the Act also appears to impose a damages cap for
Covered Home Loans and High Cost Home Loans that limits the Act's
New Jersey Home Loans from the potential liability that might accrue from such loans that
violate the Act. See § 46: 1OB-27(e).
256. The Act's statute of limitations provisions are best understood by recognizing that
HOSA is enacted against the background of New Jersey's default statute of limitations
provisions of six years for tort causes of action. § 2A:14-1. Consistent with this
understanding, certain provisions of HOSA expressly limit the time in which to bring a cause
of action. See id. § 46:10B-27(c)(1) (providing six-year statute of limitations for original
actions brought against assignees of Covered Home Loans); id. § 46:10B-27 (c)(l)-(2)
(providing statute of limitations period equal to the term of the loan, for Covered Home Loans
and High Cost Home Loan borrowers asserting claims or defenses, brought in an individual
capacity only, that seek certain equitable relief). For all other causes of action under HOSA,
New Jersey's default tort statute of limitations of six years should apply.
257. Id. § 46:10B-27(a).
258. An alternative reading would authorize borrowers to choose to sue the
subcategory of Sales and Services Creditors for damages under either the Consumer Fraud
Act, section 46:101B-29(b)'s statutory damages provisions, or section 46:101B-27(a)'s
recoupment provision, whichever is the greater.
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general Creditor liability provisions. Section 6(c) limits damages against a
Covered Home Loan or a High Cost Home Loan "creditor or subsequent
holder or assignee of the home loan," to a borrower's remaining obligation
under the loan plus costs and attorney's fees. 25 9 The additional reference to
"creditor" liability in a section of the Act that deals primarily with assignee
liability, and which would have the potential effect of limiting damages
otherwise generally available against Creditors, is unexpected.
Beyond the possibility that this phrasing is a mere drafting error, the best
way to reconcile the apparent limitation on Creditor liability contained in
section 6 with the general Creditor liability provisions in section 8 is by
reading the Act as providing a choice of damages between these sections,
which can be exercised by a borrower depending upon the time in which the
action is brought. The general Creditor liability and damages provisions of
section 8 apply to actions brought within the statute's default six-year statute
of limitations. 2 60 The cap on Creditor damages would apply to equitable
claims and defenses to foreclosure, collection or debt acceleration actions
that section 6 authorizes a borrower to assert at any time during the term of
the loan. 2 6 1 Thus, if a borrower brings an original action within six years of
a Covered Home Loan closing, that borrower can sue for damages either
under section 6 or under section 8.262 After six years, however, a borrower
could assert a response (as a claim, counterclaim, or defense) to a collection,
foreclosure or debt acceleration action brought by either a High Cost Home
Loan or Covered Home Loan Creditor, and collect under the limited
damages provided by section 6. Under this reading, borrowers typically
would use section 6 against creditors for disputes arising six years after a
Covered Home Loan or High Cost Home Loan closing and would typically

259. Id. § 46:10B-27(c) (emphasis added).
260. See supra text accompanying note 256.
261. See § 46:10B-27(c)(1) (authorizing borrowers to assert at any time a defense,
claim or counterclaim against Covered Home Loan creditors, in response to foreclosure or
collection action, debt acceleration, or following borrower's sixty-day default).
262. In most circumstances, the general Creditor damages provisions contained in
section 8 would be greater than "the amount required to reduce or extinguish the borrower's
liability under the loan" for which a borrower can sue under section 6. However, there are
certain circumstances, such as where a lawsuit is commenced immediately after the
origination of a prohibited loan and where a borrower has not yet accrued significant finance
charges, in which damages under section 6 would be greater. Section 46:101B-27(c)(1) says
nothing about limiting damages on High Cost Home Loans. Accordingly, an original action
brought within six years of a High Cost Home Loan closing should be governed by section 8
exclusively.
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use the general Creditor liability provision of section 8 to bring original
claims against such Creditors within six years of the closing.
2. Assignee Liability
The Act includes an express assignee liability provision in order to
partially abrogate the scope of the Holder in Due Course doctrine and
thereby increase the reach of the Act's remedies and defenses. As previously
described, the Holder in Due Course doctrine frequently imposes a
substantial impediment to borrowers who seek redress for their predatory
loans, because it shields good faith purchasers and assignees of those loans
from liability for even the most outrageous conduct by the originating
lenders. 2 63 Because many predatory lenders depend for their financing on
the securitization of their mortgage pools and subsequent sale on the
secondary markets, 264 the Act's assignee liability provisions are meant to
reduce resources available to originators of those loans who violate the Act.
The assignee liability provisions, like the Act's prohibitions themselves,
depend upon how a loan is classified.
a. High Cost Home Loans
Two provisions regulate assignee liability for High Cost Home Loans.
The first provision allows a borrower to assert any and all affirmative claims
for damages - including the general damages election described above - or
defenses that she may have against the original High Cost Home Loan
Creditor. 2 65 As such, this assignee liability provision is a complete
abrogation of the Holder in Due Course doctrine for High Cost Home Loans.
A borrower of a High Cost Home Loan can, therefore, assert any affirmative
claim for damages available under section 8 of the Act, including damages
under the Consumer Fraud Act or statutory damages, as well as any
available claims or defenses, including strong defenses to foreclosure,
The statute
equally against both the Creditor and the subsequent purchaser.
2 66
years.
six
be
would
claims
such
for
period
of limitations

263. See supra text accompanying notes 118-23.
264. See supra text accompanying notes 33-39.
265. See § 46:101B-27(a) (providing that purchaser or assignee of High Cost Home
Loan is "subject to all affirmative claims and any defenses with respect to the loan that the
borrower could assert against the original creditor or broker of the loan").
266. See supra text accompanying note 256.
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While this abrogation of the Holder in Due Course doctrine is sweeping,
the Act does provide certain safe harbors for those assignees who did not
intend to invest in High Cost Home Loans. The safe harbor is available to an
assignee who can demonstrate that, employing "reasonable due diligence," it
could not have determined that the purchased loan was a High Cost Home
Loan. 2 67 This safe harbor provides a variety of simple and low-cost ways for
assignees and purchasers to preserve traditional Holder in Due Course
defenses for High Cost Home Loans that they inadvertently purchase. But
for those who fail to comply with the safe harbor provisions or who intend to
invest in High Cost Home Loans, the Act does abrogate the Holder in Due
Course doctrine and subjects them to all claims and defenses available
against the originating Creditors. In order to avoid potential liability,
therefore, secondary market actors will either avoid purchasing High Cost
267. § 46: 1OB-27(b). The Act sets forth a basis for a purchaser or assignee to be given
a presumption that it has exercised such due diligence. The purchaser or assignee must
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that it:
(1) has in place at the time of the purchase or assignment of the loan, policies that
expressly prohibit its purchase or acceptance of assignment of any high cost home
loan;
(2) requires by contract that a seller or assignor of home loans to the purchaser or
assignee represents and warrants to the purchaser or assignee that either
(a) it will not sell or assign any high cost home loan to the purchaser or assignee
or
(b) that the seller or assignor is a beneficiary of a representation and warranty
from a previous seller or assignor to that effect; and
(3) exercises reasonable due diligence at the time of purchase or assignment of home
loans or within a reasonable period of time thereafter intended by the purchaser or
assignee to prevent the purchaser or assignee from purchasing or taking assignment
of any high cost home loan.
Id.; see also BUuLETI No. 03-30, supra note 133, at 1-2.
The Act does not specifically define "reasonable due diligence." DOBI has taken the
position that reasonable due diligence does not typically require an assignee to review every
loan being purchased:
The Department considered the concept of "reasonable due diligence" as generally
understood by courts, which is "what a reasonable person would have done in his
situation given the same information." The Department is in the process of reviewing
common banking and secondary market practices regarding due diligence review of
mortgage pools, as well as similar due diligence in the securities context, and
believes, based on the information it has obtained to date, that sampling is a standard
accepted practice.
BULiErN No. 03-15, supra note 125, at 8; see also BuLLETIN No. 03-30, supra note 133, at 3
(indicating that upgraded due diligence should be conducted if High Cost Home Loans are
found in pools for which there are representations that no such loans are contained in such
pools).
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Home Loans altogether by complying with the safe harbor provision or
undertake the due diligence required to purchase only those High Cost Home
Loans that do not violate any of the Act's provisions.
The second assignee liability provision applies to an assignee that meets
the criteria entitling it to the protections of the Act's safe harbor provisions,
but with limited potential damages. Against assignees that meet the Act's
safe harbor provisions, a borrower can still assert any equitable claims and
defenses to the assignee's foreclosure or collection action that it could have
raised against the original creditor. 2 6 8 While such defenses can be asserted
against a foreclosing or collecting High Cost Home Loan assignee, at any
time during the term of the loan, damages are limited to the borrower's
2 69
remaining obligation under the loan plus costs and attorney's fees.
b. Covered Home Loans
The Act does not fully abrogate the Holder in Due Course doctrine (and
thereby authorize maximum liability) for assignees of Covered Home Loans
in the way that it does for the assignees of High Cost Home Loans that fail
to meet the safe harbor provision. 27 0 Specifically, section 46:101B-27(c)
provides for limited damages against assignees of Covered Home Loans in
the amount of the remaining obligation under the loan, plus costs and
attorney's fees. 2 7 1 Within six years of the closing of a Covered Home Loan,

a borrower can bring such claims in an original action; 2 72 during the entire
term of the loan, however, a borrower can assert claims or defenses in

268. § 46: 1OB-27(b)(2). This section would also allow a borrower to bring an original
claim against a High Cost Home Loan assignee after the assignee (i) initiated a collection or
foreclosure action; (ii) accelerated the loan debt; and, notably (iii) after the loan debt has
become sixty days in default. Id. This final ground is notable because it is the only
circumstance in which borrowers would not have to wait for action by a High Cost Home
Loan assignee to commence a lawsuit, but could trigger authorization to sue by deliberately
going into sixty-day default.
269. Id. § 46:1OB-27(c).
270. Cf. id. § 46:10B-27(b) (entitling borrowers to assert against assignees of High
Cost Home Loans any and all claims that could have been asserted against a High Cost Home
Loan creditor, unless the assignee meets the Act's safe harbor provisions).
271. Id. § 46:10B-27(c). This provision limiting damages to those suing in an
individual capacity would, of course, prohibit class actions under this subsection of the Act.
272. Id. § 46:1OB-27(c)(1).
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response to a collection, foreclosure or debt acceleration action brought by a
Covered Home Loan assignee.2 7 3
c. Home Loans
The Act's assignee liability provisions are more limited for Home Loans
and appear to be based on the FTC Holder in Due Course rule (the FTC
Holder Rule). 2 74 Liability for holders of Home Loans applies only to those
loans made in connection with a manufactured home or home improvement
contract and offering slightly limited damages. Accordingly, if a Home Loan
"was made, arranged, or assigned by a person selling either a manufactured
home, or home improvements to the dwelling of a borrower, or was made by
or through a Creditor to whom the borrower was referred by such seller, the
borrower may assert all affirmative claims and any defenses that the
borrower may have against the seller or home-improvement contractor. ' 27 5
That is, if either a manufactured home seller or a home improvement
contractor is working in tandem with a Creditor, the borrower may assert
any claims or defenses it has against the former in an action brought against
(or brought by) the ultimate holder of the Home Loan. 2 76
273. Id. § 46:10B-27(c)(1). As with the provision for High Cost Home Loan assignee
liability, this section would also allow a borrower to bring an original claim against a Covered
Home Loan assignee after the assignee (i) initiated a collection or foreclosure action; (ii)
accelerated the loan debt; and, notably (iii) after the loan debt has become sixty days in
default. Id.; see also supranote 266.
274. See supra text accompanying notes 118-23.
275. § 46:10B-27(a).
276. Although the Act does not address how much involvement a home improvement
contractor or manufactured home seller must have in arranging a Home Loan for section
46:1OB-27(a) to apply, DOBI has taken the position that
the requisite level of involvement will be reached if the contractor or seller is
sufficiently involved in making or otherwise participating in the home loan as
consistent with the substantial guidance and precedent that underlies the FTC Holder
Rule. For example, the circumstances in which a home improvement contractor will
be determined to have "referred" a borrower to a lender under [section] 46: 1OB-27a,
will include "those situations where a [home repair] seller, in the ordinary course of
business, is sending his buyers to a particular loan outlet, or to particular outlets, for
credit which is to be used in the sellers' establishment. In such circumstances, the
seller is effectively arranging credit for his customers."
BuLLETIN No. 03-15, supra note 125, at 5-6 (citations omitted).
DOBI will use the FTC Holder Rule definition of "seller" in determining who would
qualify as a "person selling either a manufactured home or home improvements" under the
Act. BuLLEri No. 03-30, supra note 133, at 5. "Seller" is there defined as a "person who, in
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3. Defenses
The Act provides significant good faith defenses to liability for
Creditors in order to encourage Creditors to correct potentially illegal loan
terms on their own. Specifically, Creditors acting in good faith who fail to
comply with the Act may escape liability under the Act if the Creditor: (i)
within 45 days of the loan closing, makes restitution to the borrower and
adjusts the loan; or (ii) within 90 days of the loan closing and prior to
receiving any notice from the borrower of the compliance failure, notifies
and makes restitution to the borrower and adjusts the loan. 2 7 7 The latter
defense is available only where the compliance failure was unintentional and
resulted from a bona fide error, notwithstanding the maintenance of
procedures reasonably adopted to avoid such errors. 2 78 These provisions
encourage Creditors to conduct post-closing due diligence and correct
unintentional violations of the Act.
IV. EVALUATING THE ACT'S EFFECTIVENESS

Throughout the period of the Act's consideration in the New Jersey
legislature and lingering still is the important concern as to whether the
Act's provisions will have the unintended and harmful consequence of
reducing the availability of legitimate, desired subprime credit in the state.
We believe that the Act will not materially reduce the availability of such
credit.
A. The ContinuedAvailability of Subprime Credit in New Jersey
A persistent objection leveled against HOSA and other, similar efforts to
regulate high cost loans is that they are ultimately counterproductive. Critics
the ordinary course of business, sells or leases goods or services to consumers." 16 C.F.R.
§ 433.1(j) (2003).
277. § 46:10B-29(c). The Act preempts all municipality, county or political
subdivision ordinances, resolutions, or any other rules or regulations related to Home Loan
lending practices. Id. § 46:10B-34. The lending industry regarded the inclusion of the
preemption clause as a significant victory. They argued that multiple layers of regulation adds
to lenders' compliance costs and increases the risk of unintentional statutory violations. See,
e.g., Press Release, Origination News, MBANJ Backs Compromise (Apr. 2003), availableat
http://www.acom.org/canpaigns/pc.php?p=21 11.
278. § 46:10B-29(c). "Examples of bona fide errors include clerical, calculation,
computer malfunction and programming, and printing errors. An error of legal judgment with
respect to a person's obligations under this section is not a bona fide error." Id.
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argue that such regulations make it both so risky and costly to make higher
cost loans that many subprime lenders will abandon subprime lending
entirely, leaving subprime borrowers without sufficient access to home
equity credit. 2 7 9 This concern, however, appears to be largely overstated.
Based on the dynamics of the subprime lending market and the experience of
other states, HOSA will probably discourage the origination of many
predatory, high cost loans while leaving an ample supply of subprime credit
available for this still lucrative market. Indeed, it may be that the Act does
not go far enough: HOSA's high cost loan triggers could have been set even
lower to bring in a greater proportion of loans within its scope of its more
restrictive provisions without causing a harmful reduction in legitimate
subprime lending.
First, a central premise of the concern over the Act's possible
undermining of legitimate subprime lending - that the higher costs
associated with making subprime loans under HOSA will make their
extension unprofitable 28 0 - appears flawed. As an initial matter, HOSA's
High Cost Home Loan APR trigger - 8% above the prevailing Treasury
rate - is still very high. Nationally, subprime loans have interest rates that
average 2.5% to 4% above prime mortgage rates. 2 8 1 Thus, HOSA's High

279. See, e.g., Kelly K. Spors, Subprime Bill Aims to Mute State Laws: Republican's
Proposalto PolicePredatoryLending Would Set Weaker NationalStandards, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 14, 2003, at A4.
The subprime-lending industry complains that local regulation is confusing and
counterproductive. For example, legislation enacted in Georgia makes anyone who
winds up owning the loans - including Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac - liable for
lending violations. As a result, Fannie and Freddie have stopped buying some loans
made in Georgia. Standard & Poor's and Moody's Investors Service have said they
will no longer rate mortgage-backed securities that include loans covered by the law,
and some subprime lenders say they have pulled certain products out of the market
there.
Id.
280.

See

RIcHARD

F.

DEMONG,

NAT'L HOME EQurry

MORTGAGE ASS'N, THE

POTrErmIAL IMPACT OF THE NEW JERSEY HOME OwNRmsiu SEcuRry ACT OF 2002 (2003)

(study conducted prior to S&P decision to rate most New Jersey home loans, concluding that
HOSA will drive many major subprime lenders from New Jersey), at http://www.nhema.
org/press.asp?bid=517 (Nov. 26, 2003); see also Chris Gosier, New Mortgage Law Hits
Home Differently With Lenders, Buyers, DAILY RECORD, Nov. 17, 2003, available at
http://www.dailyrecord.com/news/articles/news2-mortgagelaw 17.htm.
281. See supra text accompanying notes 17-18.
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proportion
Cost Home Loan prohibitions will affect only a relatively small2 82
high.
already
are
that
rates
at
and
market
lending
of the subprime
In addition, as highlighted elsewhere, studies of the subprime market
demonstrate a low correlation between a borrower's credit risk and mortgage
pricing, which would suggest a significant range of subprime lending
283
profitability at rates below HOSA's High Cost Home Loan triggers.
Underwriting standards among different subprime lenders vary greatly, as do
underwriting standards within a particular lending entity over time. 2 84 As a
result, and very much unlike the prime market, the range of pricing of
subprime loans varies so greatly - between 3.00% and 19.99% in 1999
according to one study 2 85 - that subprime lending rates cannot consistently
risk variations and very likely
or accurately account for legitimate credit
28 6
reflect a strong bias toward overpricing.
Indeed, studies by both government sponsored entities and the subprime
industry itself demonstrate that a substantial proportion of subprime
borrowers are currently highly overcharged for their mortgages. The
chairman of Fannie Mae estimated that in 2000 approximately 50% of all
subprime borrowers could have qualified for a lower cost prime loan based
on their credit risk.2 87 A 1996 industry-sponsored poll of 50 of the then-

282. Evidence suggests that HOEPA's 8% APR trigger is too high to cover a
significant proportion of potentially abusive subprime loans. JOINT HUD-TREASURY REPORT,
supra note 8, at 85.
supra note 18, at 536 (arguing that pricing in the subprime
283. See MANSFmE,
market "does not appear to be based on a legitimate assessment of risk").
284. See WEiCHER, supra note 16, at 34-35 (describing substantial variety of
underwriting criteria among subprime lending entities and within individual firms over time,
which can result in large discrepancies in pricing to similarly-situated borrowers).
285. Mansfield, supra note 18, at 536. In contrast, prime loans around that period fell
into a range of under 2%. Id.
286. Id. at 544-45 ("[lIt is not clear that pricing in the subprime market has any basis
at all. Lenders will not carefully correlate price to risk when they can just as easily charge
whatever rate they choose."). One study estimated that charging interest rates higher than
justified by a borrower's credit risk costs American borrowers $2.9 billion annually. STmN,
supra note 5, at 9-11. But see GREGORY ELtmuAusEN & MIcHAEL STATEN, REGULATION OF
SUBPRIME MORTGAGE PRODUCTS: AN ANALYSIS OF NORTH CAROLINA'S PREDATORY LENDING

14-15 [hereinafter ELumAUSEN STUDY] (Georgetown Univ., Working Paper No. 66,
2002) (suggesting that data in North Carolina reveals that allegedly predatory loans are priced
to reflect risk), availableat http://www.msb.edu/prog/ crc/pdf/RevisedWP66.pdf (Nov. 2002).
287. Fannie Mae has Played CriticalRole in Expansion of Minority Homeownership
Over Past Decade, Raines Pledges to Lead Market for African American Mortgage Lending,
Bus. WIRE, Mar. 2, 2000, LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
LAW
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most active subprime lenders came to a similar conclusion. 2 8 8 Accordingly,
even if HOSA eliminates a majority of High Cost Home Loans in New
Jersey, legitimate subprime lenders and even prime lenders will find a large,
profitable range in which they would be willing to extend credit to
traditional subprime borrowers. Indeed, the above analysis suggests that
pricing of subprime lending is sometimes so highly uncorrelated to credit
risk and biased upward that HOSA APR triggers could be set even lower
without jeopardizing the provision of subprime credit in New Jersey. 2 8 9
Second, the experience of other states that have enacted similar high
cost loan regulations demonstrates that HOSA's attempts to diminish
abusive lending practices will not destroy the legitimate subprime lendingmarket. In 1999, North Carolina became the first state to enact a
comprehensive law to address predatory lending abuses in the residential
mortgage market. 29 0 The North Carolina law is substantially similar to
HOSA because it prohibits loan terms and practices in connection with high
cost loans - which North Carolina defined at 10% higher than comparable
Treasury rate and/or points and fees in excess of 5% of the total loan
amount. 29 1 The North Carolina act prohibits, among many other things,
financing of any points or fees, balloon payments, negative amortizations,
loan flipping without reasonable, tangible net benefit to the borrower,
prepayment penalties, and lending without regard to the borrower's ability to
92
repay. 2
Recent studies undertaken to evaluate the impact of the law on North
Carolina's residential mortgage market find some reduction in subprime loan
originations following its implementation, but differ on the significance of
that reduction. One study conducted by researchers at the University of
North Carolina (the Quercia Study) finds that the law operated almost
288. Half of Subprime Loans Categorizedas "A" Quality, INSIDE B&C ENDING, June
10, 1996, at 7-8.
289. In deciding to lower the HOEPA trigger from 10% to 8% in 2001, the Federal
Reserve Board concluded that there would still be a significant market for credit available to
subprime borrowers. Federal Reserve Board Commentary on Proposed Amendments to
Regulation Z, 66 Fed. Reg. 65,604, 65,607 (Dec. 20, 2001) (to be codified at C.F.R. pt. 226)
("Data submitted by a trade association representing nondepository institution lenders suggest
that there is an active market for HOEPA loans under the current APR trigger. There is no
evidence that the impact on credit availability will be significant if the trigger is lowered.").
That conclusion has been borne out and may also suggest that an even lower APR trigger
would still accommodate substantial subprime lending activity.
290. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-l.lA (1999).
291. Id. § 24-L.IE(6)(b).
292. Id. § 24-1.1A(7)(c)(2).
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exactly as intended. 2 93 The Quercia Study concluded that loan originations
with predatory features decreased substantially in North Carolina after the
law's enactment, 2 9 4 but did not materially decrease either the supply of
diversity of subprime
subprime credit to low-income borrowers or the
2 95
them.
to
extended
traditionally
products
mortgage
The Quercia Study attempted to improve upon the methodology of an
earlier study conducted by the researchers at Georgetown University's
School of Business (the Elliehausen Study) which had concluded that the
North Carolina law caused a 14% decline in subprime originations in the
state, a decline the study concluded fell disproportionately on the state's
lowest-income borrowers. 2 9 6 There are some notable differences between
the methodology employed by both studies. Specifically, the Quercia Study
relied on loan data that covered an additional period of almost two years
after the North Carolina act's enactment and also compared the North
Carolina loan data to data obtained from all fifty states, rather than
comparing the North Carolina loan data to the four neighboring states
examined by the Elliehausen Study. 2 97 Perhaps more importantly, the
See ROBERTO G. QUERCIA ET AL., UNIV. OF N.C. AT CHAPEL HIL, THE IMPACT OF
NORTH CAROLINA'S ANTI-PREDATORY LENDING LAw: A DESCRIPTIVE ASSESSMENT (2003),
http://www.kenan-flagler.unc.edu/assets/documents/CCNCAnti_
at
available
PredatoryLawjmpact.pdf (June 25, 2003); see also KEITH ERNST ET AL., CTR. FOR
293.

RESPONSIBLE LENDING, NORTH CAROLINA'S SUBPRIME HOME LOAN MARKET AFTER
PREDATORY LENDING REFORM (2002), available at http://www.mortgagebankers.org/

state-.update/2002/nc/nc-study0814.pdf.
294. See QUERCIA ET AL, supra note 293, at 18-20, 36-38 tbls.11-13 (documenting
North Carolina's comparative decrease in loans containing prepayment penalties, balloon
payments and exceedingly high loan-to-value ratios); see also ERNST ET AL., supra note 293, at
8-9 (documenting post-enactment decrease in flipped loans without reasonable, tangible net
benefit to the borrower of 7%, decrease in "excess fees" of 25%, decrease in single premium
credit insurance of 20%, decrease in incidence of loans with prepayment penalties of 35%,
and estimating that the law saved North Carolina homeowners a total of $100 million).
295. See QUERCtA ET AL., supra note 293, at 12-21 (concluding that the subprime
lending market in North Carolina is still large and vibrant after the law's enactment, that a
substantial portion of the limited decrease in subprime lending is attributable to the decrease
in predatory loans, and that subprime purchase loans actually increased after the law's
passage); see also ERNST ET AL., supra note 293, at 3-7 (concluding that the subprime market
in North Carolina is still very strong after the act's passage, that the proportion of subprime
lending to lowest-income borrowers actually increased after the law's passage, and that there
has been no increase in the pricing in subprime loans since the law's passage that might have
been associated with a decrease in loan availability).
296. See ELumAUSEN STUDY, supra note 286, at 13.
297. Compare QuERciA ET AL., supra note 293, at 10 (analyzing loans originated from
1998 to 2002), with ELLUEHAUSEN STUDY, supra note 286, at 9 (analyzing loans originated
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Elliehausen Study did not distinguish between desirable and undesirable
subprime loans. The North Carolina law prohibits the practice of flipping

borrowers from one loan into a new subprime loan, where the new loan
offers no reasonable net benefit to the borrower. Thus, part of the purported
reduction of subprime mortgage originations in North Carolina may well be
attributable to a decrease in unreasonable refinances that the law
intentionally targeted. 2 98 Ultimately, it appears that predatory subprime
originations have declined in North Carolina at the same time that the
overall subprime market remains healthy. 2 9 9
At the time of publication of this Article, the National Home Equity
Mortgage Association (NHEMA) released the results of a study it
commissioned along with the National Association of Mortgage Brokers (the
NHEMA Study), purporting to quantify a substantial reduction in subprime
loan originations in New Jersey following HOSA's passage. 30 0 The
NHEMA Study claims that, in a two month period following the Act's
implementation, cash-out refinances in New Jersey decreased 67.2% and the
total volume of subprime originations decreased in New Jersey between
eight hundred million and one billion dollars. 3 0 1 However, the NHEMA
from January 1, 1997 to June 30, 2000). Since the publication of both studies, commentators
have criticized a variety of aspects of the studies' methodologies and data sets. See OCC
Working Paper, supra note 37 (criticizing Quercia Study); ROBERT E. LrrAN, NORTH
CAROLINA PREDATORY LENDING LAW: STILL A PROBLEM DEPSlTE NEW STUDY (2003)
(criticizing Quercia Study); NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR. ET AL., COMMENTS TO THE OFFCE OF
CoMPTROI iaER OF CURRENCY, BANKING AcTlvTES AND OPERATIONS; REAL ESTATE LENDING
AND

APPRAISALs (2003), available at http://www.naca.net/CommentsOCCNatBnkPreempt.

pdf (Oct. 6, 2003) (criticizing OCC Working Paper); MICHAEL A.

STEGMAN ET AL-, AEIBROOKINGS JOINT CTR. FOR REGULATORY STUDIES, NC's ANTI-PREDATORY LENDING LAW:
DOING WHAT IT'S SUPPOSED To Do: A REPLY 1 (2003), available at http:llaei-

brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/page.php?id=299 (Nov. 2003).
298. See KEm D. HARVEY & PEmR J. NIGRO, DO PREDATORY LENDING LAWS
INFLUENCE MORTGAGE LENDING? AN ANALYSIS OF THE NORTH CAROLINA PREDATORY LENDING

LAW 25 (2002) (attributing the limited decline of subprime lending in North Carolina to the
decrease in loan application rates, not to loan denial rates).
299. See Lenders Will Try To Pin Down Effects of North CarolinaLaw, INSIDE B&C
LENDING, Mar. 5, 2001, at 3-5 (reporting that North Carolina lenders were offering full range
of mortgage products after the Act's enactment and that there was "little or no variation" in
pricing of those products as compared with other neighboring states).
300.

RICHARD F. DEMONG, UNIV. OF VA., THE IMPACT OF THE NEW JERSEY HOME

OWNERSHIP SECURrrY ACT OF 2002 (2004) [hereinafter NHEMA STUDY], available at
http://www.nhema.org/press.aspbid=596 (Mar. 26, 2004).
301. Id.; see also Richard Newman, Lenders Fear Stifling Effects of Law Targeting
Predatory Loans, THE RECORD, Oct. 26, 2003, at BI (reporting that five loan originators

RUTGERS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 35:645

Study appears to suffer from methodological flaws 3 02 and also fails to
distinguish between decreases in legitimate subprime lending and predatory
lending. 30 3 Furthermore, the NHEMA Study measured respondents' lending
practices over only a two month period - a period that coincided with a
wave of enormously negative publicity directed at the law by mortgage
lenders, mortgage brokers, NHEMA and other industry groups in a focused
effort to have the law substantially revised. 3 0 4 As a result, the responses may
also have been based upon a misperception of the Act's scope or the Act's
liability provisions. 30 5 However, if North Carolina's experience is in fact
instructive, the New Jersey mortgage industry should shortly learn to comply
with the Act's requirements and continue to originate legitimate subprime
loans sufficient, if slightly diminished, to meet consumer demand.

doing business in New Jersey plan to curtail their practice of refinancing loans), available at
2001 WL 4634599.
302. For instance, the NHEMA STUDY does not take into account the 72% decrease in
refinances across the nation during the same period and therefore does not reliably isolate
HOSA as the cause for the drop in New Jersey subprime refinancing. See MORTGAGE
BANKERS ASSOCIATION, RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE ORIGINATION,

PURCHASE, OUTSTANDING,

AND MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITY DATA (2003) (demonstrating drop in national refinancing

from $815 billion to $310 billion between third and fourth quarter of 2003), available at
http://www.mortgagebankers.org/marketdata (last updated Mar. 25, 2004). In addition, the
study does not acknowledge the real possibility that the thirteen respondents, out of the
twenty-four surveyed, were invested in undercutting the law, which might well cause them to
attribute the decrease in their subprime refinances to HOSA's passage rather than to the
increase in interest rates that appear to have driven the nationwide decrease in refinances.
303. For example, the study notes that 84% of the lenders and mortgage brokers it
surveyed reported that they have reduced "certain types of subprime lending in New Jersey as
a result of HOSA." NHEMA STUDY, supra note 300, at 2. Naturally, however, this reduction
in "certain types of subprime lending" is the expected and desirable effect of the Act's
prohibition on predatory practices.
304. Mary P. Gallagher, Poor Prospects Seen for Bills That Ease Up on Home
Mortgage Lenders, N.J. L.J., Dec. 29, 2003, at 7; Suzette Parmley, Bills to Dilute NJ.
Lending Law Advancing, PHIIA. INQUIRER, Dec. 11, 2003, at Al.
305. See Press Release, New Jersey Dep't of Banking and Ins., Mortgage Industry
18, 2003), available at
(Nov.
Law
Lending
Over Predatory
Rebuked
http://www.state.nj.us/dobi/PressReleases/pr111803.htm. Here, DOBI Director Tillman is
quoted as saying:
We also have learned that many of our lenders have wasted their time and money by
attending programs or presentations where too much time was spent bashing the new
law or pointing out the problems and pitfalls, and not enough time explaining how
you could successfully navigate the new rules and continue operating.
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B. The Reaction of the Secondary Market to HOSA
As previously described, lenders frequently pool together many of their
mortgages, and, through structured finance transactions arranged by
investment banks, securitize the mortgages and sell them to a variety of
investors on the secondary market. 30 6 This process of securitization has in
large part driven the dramatic rise of subprime lending. 30 7 Prior to their sale,
the secondary market demands that such transactions be rated by one or
more of the major bond and securities rating agencies - Standard & Poor's
Ratings Services (S&P), Fitch, Inc. (Fitch) and Moody's Investors Service,
Inc. (Moody's) - to identify the level of risk associated with the pool. 30 8
The role of such agencies is essential to the operation of the entire subprime
mortgage pipeline; indeed, without such a rating from at least one of these
agencies, most investors on the secondary market will not buy into a
mortgage pool. 3 09
Recently, after Georgia passed a predatory lending law that contained a
broad assignee liability provision applicable to those loans designated under
that statute as high cost, the major rating agencies actually refused to rate
residential mortgage-backed securities pools containing any loans that
originated in Georgia after the effective date of the law.3 10 The Georgia law
See supra text accompanying note 33.
See supra text accompanying note 34.
308. See KENN= G. LORE & CAMERON L. COwAN, MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURIT[ES §
1.18 (2003); see also Press Release, Standard & Poor's, Evaluating Predatory Lending Laws:
Standard and Poor's Explains its Approach (Apr. 15, 2003), available at http://www.
housingchoice.orglnews%20stories/04152003.htm; Press Release, Moody's Investors Service,
Inc., Moody's Reports on Impact of Predatory Lending Laws in RMBS (Mar. 26, 2003),
available at http://www.moodys.com.
309. LORE & COwAN, supra note 308, § 1.18; see also Jonathan Fuerbringer, Agencies
to Continue to Rate Pools of New York Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2003, at C4.
310. See Press Release, Fitch Ratings, Fitch Ratings Declines to Rate Georgia Loans in
RMBS Pools, Considers Impact to Other Predatory Lending Legislation (Feb. 5, 2003),
available at http://www.mortgagebankers.org/srchindex.html; Press Release, Moody's
Investors Service, Inc., Moody's Expands Consideration of Assignee Liability for Residential
Mortgages in Securitizations (Jan. 30, 2003), available at http://www.mortgagebankers.
org/srchindex.html; Press Release, Standard and Poor's, Standard and Poor's to Disallow
Georgia Fair Lending Act Loans (Jan. 16, 2003), available at http://www.mortgagebankers.
org/srchindex.html. The credit analysis performed by the rating agencies determines if any of
the underlying loans covered by a predatory lending statute may be included in its rating
transactions and what, if any, additional credit enhancements may be required. In performing
an analysis of structured transactions backed by residential mortgage loans, rating agencies
evaluate the impact a predatory lending law might have on the availability of funds to pay
investors in the rated securities.
306.
307.
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authorized the borrower to assert against the assignee of a high cost loan any
and all claims the borrower could have asserted against a creditor but, unlike
HOSA, failed to precisely define the differences among the various
categories of regulated loans and provided no safe harbor protection for
despite
assignees who inadvertently purchased Georgia high cost loans
3 11
purchases.
such
prevent
to
place
in
having reasonable procedures
The rating agencies concluded that Georgia's assignee liability
provisions created potentially unlimited damages for purchasers of high cost
loans and were thus so risky that they could not be rated. 3 12 The agencies'
announcements caused turmoil among Georgia lenders and signaled the
3 13
imminent abandonment of financing for residential lending in the state.
Soon after, the Georgia legislature amended the statute in an attempt to
address the rating agency concerns; specifically, the amended law clarified
the distinction between high cost and other loans and included a safe harbor
3 14
provision to protect assignees that inadvertently purchase high cost loans.
As a result, the agencies changed course and announced they would rate
3 15
Georgia residential mortgages.
After the enactment of HOSA, S&P announced that it would not rate
pools that contain certain New Jersey residential loans. 3 16 S&P claimed that
311.

See GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-1 to -13 (2003); see also

NATALIE ABRAMS &

MAUREEN COLEMAN, STANDARD & POOR'S, STANDARD & POOR'S ADDRESSES NEw JERSEY

3-4 (2003), available at http://www.bondmarkets.com/regulatory/
SPAddressesNJLaw.pdf (May 2, 2003).
312. See Press Release, Fitch Ratings, supra note 310; Press Release, Moody's
Investors Service, Inc., supra note 310; Press Release, Standard and Poor's, supra note 310;
see also Jonathan Fuerbringer, Lending Law in New York Gets Different Interpretations,N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 26, 2003, at C3.
313. See GA. BANKER'S ASS'N, GAFLA: THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 2 (2003),
availableat http://www.gabankers.com/issuespredatorylendingwhitepaper.pdf (Jan. 2003).
314. Press Release, Standard and Poor's, supra note 308.
315. S&P and Moody's both announced that they would rate all pools that do not
contain high cost loans. Press Release, Standard & Poor's, Standard & Poor's Will Admit
Georgia Mortgage Loans Into Rated Structured Finance Transactions (Mar. 11, 2003),
available at http://www.standardandpoors.com; Press Release, Moody's Investors Service,
Inc., Moody's To Rate RMBS Backed by Georgia Home Loans (Mar. 13, 2003), available at
http://www.moodys.com/moodys/cust/research/babylon/Release/Rating%20Action/noncategofizednumber/2001900000420337.asp?namedEntity=Rating+Action. Fitch announced that it would
rate all residential mortgage pools, including those that contained high cost loans, if they also
included additional credit enhancements. See Press Release, Fitch Ratings, Fitch Revises Its
Rating Criteria in the Wake of Predatory Lending Legislation (May 1, 2003), available at
http://www.mortgagebankers.orglindustry/reports/03/fitch_0501 .htm.
316. Specifically, it announced that it would not rate pools that contain the following
types of loans ("Excluded Loans"): High Cost Home Loans; Covered Home Loans; Home
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several of the Act's damages provisions were unclear and therefore might
expose assignees to unlimited liability. S&P's position threatened to
destabilize the New Jersey mortgage market and motivated the lending
industry in New Jersey to lobby for a significant dilution of HOSA's
assignee liability provisions. 3 17 However, many of S&P's concerns were
Loans made in connection with home improvements ("Home Improvement Loans"); Home
Loans made in connection with manufactured homes ("Manufactured Housing Loans"); and
open- and closed-end cash-out refinancing or junior lien mortgage loans. Press Release,
Standard and Poor's, supra note 308.
S&P had excluded cash-out refinancings and junior lien loans "because the funds from
these loans could be used for the purpose of home improvement (which loans carry the
potential for assignee liability) and this fact may not be disclosed on origination." Press
Release, Standard and Poor's, supra note 308. DOBI has taken the position that cash-out and
junior lien mortgage loans are not subject to liability under sections 46: 1OB-27(b) or (c) of the
Act "unless a home improvement contractor or manufactured home seller made the loan or
was otherwise involved as specified" in section 46:10B-27(a). BUuETIN No. 03-15, supra
note 125, at 4. DOBI recommends that lenders "look at a range of factors related to an
individual borrower's circumstances." Id. DOBI argues that the scope of section 46: 10B-27(a)
liability is based upon that imposed by the Federal Trade Commission's Holder in Due Course
Rule. Id. The FTC Holder Rule requires some degree of involvement by the home
improvement contractor or manufactured home seller for the FTC Holder Rule to become
applicable to the transaction. BUREAU OF CONSUMAER PROTECTION, GuID.qNEs ON TRADE
REGULATION RULE CONCERNING PRESERVATION OF CONSUMERS'

CLAIMs AND DEFENsES

11,396-11,401 (1976); see also 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (2003). The scope of section 46:10B-27
and that of the FTC Holder Rule do, indeed, overlap. And DOBI's interpretation of section
46:10B-27(a) is the most compelling. Nonetheless, it will be left up to the courts to decide
whether the legislature intended for that section be interpreted similarly to the FTC Holder
Rule.
In any case, DOBI notes that a purchaser of a loan will generally know whether a loan is
a home improvement loan or manufactured home loan because the FTC Holder Rule requires
that such a loan contains a prominent provision on the note itself that identifies the loan as a
loan to which assignee liability may be attached. BULLETIN No. 03-15, supra note 125, at 4.
The FTC provision reads as follows:
NOTICE
ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT CONTRACT IS SUBJECT TO
ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES WHICH THE DEBTOR COULD ASSERT
AGAINST THE SELLER OF GOODS OR SERVICES OBTAINED WITH THE
PROCEEDS HEREOF. RECOVERY HEREUNDER BY THE DEBTOR SHALL
NOT EXCEED AMOUNTS PAID BY THE DEBTOR HEREUNDER.
16 C.F.R. § 433.2.
This requirement, of course, would not protect the assignee who purchases from an
originator who fails to comply with the FTC Holder Rule.
317. S&P Surprises Lenders; Decision Not To Rate Certain Pools Cuts New
PredatoryLaw Support, BROKER, June/July 2003, at 30 (quoting E. Robert Levy, Executive
Director, Mortgage Bankers Ass'n of New Jersey/League of Mortgage Lenders) ("We

RUTGERS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 35:645

unmerited. For example, S&P asserted, without clear explanation, that the
3 18
Act creates unlimited liability for assignees of Covered Home Loans.

However, as previously explained, assignee liability for Covered Home
Loans is specifically limited by the Act: (i) to suits brought in an individual
capacity and (ii) for damages that cannot exceed the borrower's remaining
3 19
obligation under the loan plus costs and reasonable attorney's fees.

In contrast to S&P's initial position, Moody's and Fitch, the other major
rating agencies quickly concluded that, despite some ambiguities in the
Act's damages provisions, the risks to assignees are low enough that they
will continue to rate New Jersey mortgage pools containing most types of
Home Loans. 32 0 Moody's will generally not rate pools that contain more
than 2% purchase money (that is, not refinanced) High Cost Home Loans or
those that contain more than 5% refinanced Covered Home Loans. 3 2 1 Fitch
will rate pools that contain Home Loans, Covered Home Loans, Home
Loans made in connection with home improvements, and Home Loans made
in connection with manufactured homes, but only so long as it receives
certification by independent third parties that such pools do not contain any
32 2
High Cost Home Loans.
S&P has since come around to a position similar to Moody's and Fitch's
position: it has now concluded that it will rate everything but High Cost
Home Loans. 32 3 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, two of the largest purchasers

obviously are not going to be able to live with the bill in the present form, unless S&P
changes their position.").
318. Press Release, Standard & Poor's, supra note 309.
319. See supra text accompanying notes 270-73.
320. Press Release, Moody's Investors Service, Inc., Moody's to Continue to Rate
RMBS Backed by New Jersey Home Loans (Sept. 22, 2003); Press Release, Fitch Ratings,
Fitch Ratings Responds to New Jersey Predatory Lending Legislation (June 5, 2003).
321.
Press Release, Moody's Investors Service, Inc., supra note 310.
322. Press Release, Fitch Ratings, supra note 310.
323. Press Release, Standard & Poor's, Standard & Poor's Implements Credit
Enhancement Criteria and Revises Representation and Warranty Criteria for Including AntiPredatory Lending Law Loans in U.S. Rated Structured Finance Transactions 2 (May 13,
2004) ("Standard & Poor's is continuing to exclude the following loans from its rated pools:
(i) High-Cost Home Loans, as defined in the New Jersey anti-predatory lending law.., and
(ii) loans governed by the Georgia Fair Lending Act prior to its amendment on March 7,
2003"), available at http://www.mortgagebankers.org/industry/news/04/0518.html. For all
New Jersey Home Loans, S&P will impose certain due diligence requirements upon sellers
"of structured finance transactions that include loans governed by" HOSA. Id. Moreover, in
order to rate loan pools containing refinancings of New Jersey Covered Home Loans
specifically, which S&P believes carries additional, subjective risk because of the "reasonable
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of residential mortgages on the secondary market, have also stated that they
will continue to purchase New Jersey Home Loans other than High Cost
32 4
Home Loans.
It is not surprising that the rating agencies have refused to rate mortgage
pools containing High Cost Home Loans because of the significant potential
liability they carry. If High Cost Home Loans are not given a bond rating,
the secondary market will cease almost entirely to finance the origination of
such loans. The assignee liability provisions of HOSA should therefore be
considered the most powerful in the entire Act. Because, as previously
described, a substantial proportion of borrowers that have been stuck with
High Cost Home Loans could have qualified for better mortgage terms, the
evaporation of High Cost Home Loans should not significantly reduce the
availability of credit for subprime borrowers. Indeed, such borrowers may
often be offered credit at a lower cost and with fairer terms.
V. CONCLUSION

In the past decade, predatory lending has become one of the most
significant threats to the realization of the American dream of home
ownership for low- and moderate-income and African-American persons.
One of the primary reasons predatory lending has been so elusive and
devastating is that it has been difficult to define or regulate. Building upon
the legislative efforts of the federal government and a small number of other
states, the New Jersey Home Ownership Security Act implements an
effective, balanced response that respects the complicated dynamic of the
subprime residential mortgage market. Despite some ambiguities, the Act
should accomplish much of its goal of curbing the worst abuses of predatory
lending while preserving the availability of credit to all New Jersey
consumers who need it.

tangible net benefit" standard applied to this category of loans, S&P will require additional
credit enhancements. Id. at 3.

324. FANNIE MAE, ANNotNcEMENr 03-12: PURCHASE OF NEw JERSEY AND NEw
Mnxico "HIGH-COST HOME LOANS," AND ILLiNOIS "HIGH-RISK HOME LOANS" (2003),

available at http://www.mortgagebankers.org/resident2O3/fannieO3-12.pdf (Nov. 21, 2003);
Letter from Michael C. May, Senior Vice President, Freddie Mac, to All Freddie Mac Sellers
and Services, Revisions to Freddie Mac's Purchase Requirements based on the enactment of
antipredatory lending legislation in New Jersey, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Illinois, Maine and
Nevada (Nov. 26, 2003), available at http://www.mortgagebankers.org/resident/2003/
freddie.indyltrl 126.pdf.

